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Executive Summary 
 
  Policymakers fight over bureaucratic structure because it helps shape the legal 
interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies through which modern governments operate. 
In this article, we update positive political theories of bureaucratic structure to encompass two 
new issues with important implications for lawyers and political scientists: the significance of 
legislative responses to a crisis, and the uncertainty surrounding major bureaucratic 
reorganizations. The resulting perspective affords a better understanding of how agencies 
interpret their legal mandates and deploy their administrative discretion.   
 
  We apply the theory to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Two 
principal questions surrounding this creation are (1) why the President changed from opposing 
the creation of a new department to supporting it and (2) why his plan for such a department was 
far beyond the scope of any other existing proposal. We argue that the President changed his 
mind in part because he did not want to be on the losing side of a major legislative battle. But 
more significantly, the President supported the massive new department in part to further 
domestic policy priorities unrelated to homeland security. By moving a large set of agencies 
within the department and instilling them with new homeland security responsibilities without 
additional budgets, the president forced these agencies to move resources out of their legacy 
mandates.  Perversely, these goals appear to have been accomplished at the expense of homeland 
security. 
 
  Finally, we briefly discuss more general implications of our perspective: first, previous 
reorganizations (such as FDR’s creation of a Federal Security Agency and Carter’s creation of an 
Energy Department) also seem to reflect presidential efforts to enhance their control of 
administrative functions – including some not directly related to the stated purpose of the 
reorganization; and, second, our analysis raises questions about some of the most often-asserted 
justifications for judicial deference to agency legal interpretations. 
 1 
Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the  
Political Design of Legal Mandates 
 




Modern governments implement most legal mandates through bureaucracies.  Politicians 
delegate authority by crafting legislative compromises, which lawyers and judges then seek to 
interpret.  But bureaucratic agencies are often the entities that most directly wield the power to 
spend money, impose penalties, provide public services, and regulate individuals and 
organizations.  Consequently, a central question in public law concerns who exactly controls the 
bureaucracy’s power to interpret and execute law.  Although legal scholars are consumed by 
normative debates concerning who should exercise such control, those debates are difficult to 
resolve or even follow in the abstract without some knowledge of the techniques used in the 
political process to control bureaucratic power over legal interpretations and over the execution 
of regulatory mandates.
1  
  Surprisingly, the creation or reorganization of bureaucratic units – such as the new 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – remains among the least-understood such 
techniques.
2  We know politicians may create or reorganize agencies for multiple reasons: to 
appear as if they are addressing a salient policy,
3 to please organized interests most likely to be 
directly impacted by the agencies,
4 to create procedures that bias agency policy in particular 
directions,
5 and (perhaps more occasionally) genuinely to address a major problem of public 
                                                           
1 For just a few thought-provoking examples of this sprawling genre, see Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The 
Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, U.  CHICAGO  OLIN  LAW  &  ECON.  PAPER  NO.  268,  YALE  L.J. 
(2006)(forthcoming); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. 
L.  REV.  1443  (2005);  Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239 (2002); Thomas W. 
Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
2 See, e.g., KAREN M. HULT, AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN 5 (1987)(“Despite the popularity of 
reorganization, the jury deciding its impact is still out – and is sharply divided”). 
3 See J OHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995); R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE 
LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990). 
4 See Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
(1994); Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency 
Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW * CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981). 
5 McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (Fall 1987): 243-77.  2 
concern in a prescriptively defensible manner.
6  We know far less, however, about how these 
different potential motivations interact, how agency structure is affected by major crises such as 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, or why politicians allocate different chunks of legal 
responsibility to distinct bureaucratic units.
7
These gaps are evident in the persistence of many unresolved puzzles about the largest 
government reorganization in a half-century – the creation of the DHS.
8  For instance, why did 
the President support the creation of DHS after initially opposing it?  Why did the agency 
become so vast, including in the reorganization a wide range of components with little or no 
responsibility for homeland security?  We also understand little about whether the crisis enabled 
or forced politicians to forge a bureaucracy that actually enhanced the government’s capacity to 
undertake security-related functions.  Even as the creation and operation of DHS continues to 
inspire controversy, policymakers and scholars have yet to address these questions.
9  Nor have 
they been resolved in the wide-ranging criticisms leveled at DHS following the Katrina disaster, 
or in light of the national security threats the Department was nominally designed to address.
10
The colossal new DHS melded the functions of twenty-two previously-existing agencies, 
from Treasury’s Customs Service, to Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center, to the 
previously independent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Upon its creation, 
the department gained regulatory authority over transportation security and matters as disparate 
                                                           
6 AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (discussing how the structure 
of the Joint Staff, through the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, was engineered to be more functional than it had been 
before). 
7 See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 (2003)(emphasizing the extent of uncertainty regarding 
why presidents choose specific designs for agencies and reorganization plans); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 
265 (1989) (discussing the difficulty in assessing the range of motivations for specific reorganization plans given 
that “presidents have taken to reorganizations the way overweight people take to fad diets…”). 
8 Regarding the size and scope of the reorganization that resulted in DHS, see Donald F. Kettl, Overview in THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S FIRST YEAR: A REPORT CARD 1 (Donald F. Kettl, ed. 2004)(“[A]t its 
inception on March 1, 2003, the DHS brought together twenty-two federal agencies and more than 170,000 
employees – the largest restructuring since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947”). 
9 For a cogent account of the creation of DHS that nonetheless fails to address these questions, see DONALD F. 
KETTL, SYSTEM UNDER STRESS: HOMELAND SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2004).  Although Kettl notes that 
the President shifted his position regarding the creation of DHS, he does not address why the President proposed 
such a massive reorganization.  Nor is his explanation of the President’s change in position, which focuses on events 
such as the testimony of FBI whistleblower Colleen Rowley, entirely convincing (the President changed positions 
on the creation of DHS well before Rowley’s congressional testimony).   
10 For criticisms involving the response of DHS and its bureaus to Katrina, see, e.g., DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE 
GREAT DELUGE 227-278 (2006); for criticisms of DHS, see, e.g., Eric Lipton an d Matthew L. Wald, Focused on 
9/11, U.S. Is Seen to Lag on New Threats, N.Y. TIMES A1, August 12, 2006; Spencer Hsu, DHS Terror Research 
Agency Struggling, WASH. POST A8, August 20, 2006.  See also sources cited infra Part III.e. 3 
as marine ecosystems and the migration of refugees.  Its ranks swelled with nearly a quarter of a 
million federal employees ranging from border inspectors to environmental compliance officers.  
Nothing of this scope had happened in the United States since the creation of the Department of 
Defense a half-century earlier.
11   
Even for reorganizations of smaller scope than that of the DHS or the Defense 
Department, the structural changes are unlikely to be solely symbolic, devoid of legal and policy 
consequences. Such an assumption ignores the aggressive infighting over structure among 
legislators, the executive branch, and organized interests.
12 Ignoring the significance of changes 
in bureaucratic structure also neglects the findings of work in political science and sociology,
13 
and the legal doctrines vesting valuable discretion in specific administrative agencies.
14  Yet we 
are only beginning to understand precisely how changes in structure shape the implementation of 
legal mandates, and how that significance would affect legislative bargaining over the contours 
of agencies such as DHS. 
We propose to address these questions by combining a detailed analysis of the legislative 
process creating DHS with a new theory of the impact of bureaucratic structure on the execution 
of legal mandates.  Our theoretical approach extends existing accounts of bureaucratic structure 
to address key features of the DHS case that also arise in other cases of bureaucratic change – 
especially the role of crisis in loosening the constraints of organizational interests and the impact 
of senior legislators guarding their committee jurisdiction.
15  In the process, our analysis fills 
                                                           
11 See Kettl, Overview, supra note 8. 
12 See Zegart, Flawed By Design, supra note 6; PETER SZANTON, FEDERAL REORGANIZATION: WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? (1981); RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT’S GOVERNMENT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
EXECUTIVE  REORGANIZATION  1936-1939  (1966).  In a related vein, Scholars of race, property, education, and 
economic geography would naturally question the analogous assumption that changes in geographic lines of 
territorial jurisdiction – where one city or county ends and another begins – are of little consequence.  For an 
insightful discussion of the path-dependent social impact of territorial subdivisions, see Richard Thompson Ford, 
Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999). 
13 Regarding the impact of structure on organizational culture, see David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and 
Economic Theory, in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 109-10 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle 
eds., 1990); CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1991).  MORE GENERALLY, SEE: Terry Moe, “Political 
Structure of Agencies," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington, 
DC:  The Brookings Institution, 1989). For a review of the political science and political economy literature on the 
political implications of bureaucratic changes, see Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle, Caught in the Middle: 
The President, Congress, and the Political-Bureaucratic System in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312 (Joel D. Aberbach 
and Mark A. Peterson, eds. 2005).
14 See Jerry Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005) 
15 Existing work in political science, and particularly in the field of positive political theory, provides important 
insights into how political officials use various ex ante and ex post techniques to control bureaucratic policy 4 
several gaps in the legal and political science literature concerning matters, such as how 
reorganizations differ from familiar procedural techniques for controlling the bureaucracy, 
including environmental impact requirements or cost benefit analyses; how reorganizations may 
be enacted despite their adverse impact on the performance of widely-held goals; and how 
presidents, legislators, and organized interests sometimes bargain about bureaucratic structure in 
the shadow of an engaged, rather than disconnected, mass public.   
As crises enlarge windows of opportunity for legislative action, policy changes in the 
area of concern – in our case, homeland security – can be driven by the efforts of politicians to 
affect regulatory and administrative activities in a different domain.  Changes in security policy 
may powerfully affect other legal and policy domains, such as the Coast Guard’s environmental 
regulatory functions, or the application of immigration laws. Second, politicians use the occasion 
of legislation to force changes elsewhere having little to do with principal issue being 
addressed.
16  While these themes are particularly relevant in the context of national and 
homeland security, they also hold important implications for the more often-studied aspects of 
bureaucratic politics, affecting domains such as pharmaceutical and environmental regulation 
and (as painfully demonstrated by the response to Hurricane Katrina) federal emergency disaster 
relief.   
Against this theoretical backdrop, our account also yields answers to the DHS-specific 
questions about the Administration’s decision to support reorganization and to pursue it on such 
a massive scale.  We argue that the President changed his mind in part about the reorganization 
because he did not want to be on the losing side of a major issue.  But more importantly, he 
supported reorganization that included a massive new department to further domestic policy 
priorities independent of homeland security. By moving a large set of agencies to the new 
department, and giving them new homeland security responsibilities without the promise of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
implementation; in particular, how they use bureaucratic structure to serve their political goals.There is a wide-
ranging literature on this topic in political science and, more recently, in positive political theory and the law. See 
infra Part II. 
16 Examples abound.  For instance, in dealing with the savings and loan crisis, Congress allowed the magnitude of 
losses from savings and loans to rise by failing to produce legislation in 1986.  The conflict stemmed from 
differences in what add-ons should be included to the legislation, such as housing benefits or unrelated features of 
bank regulation.  Similarly, the major savings and loan bailout legislation in 1989 greatly increased the costs of 
dealing with that crisis by prescribing other benefits as part of the legislation, notably, housing and urban 
redevelopment. See Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast, Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle, in POLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES __ (Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, eds. 1991). 5 
additional budgets, the President forced these agencies to draw resources away from their legacy 
mandates.   
Though such changes have unquestionably become part of the President’s legacy, fixing 
the precise extent to which he and his top advisers consciously schemed to weaken domestic 
administrative and legacy mandates without regard for a corresponding homeland security 
benefit must await the judgment of history.  But our analysis does establish three crucial realities.  
First, the Administration eventually pressed for the largest possible Department despite the 
security-related risks of the merger identified by some of the Administration’s own aides.   
Second, many of the key players participating in or affected by the Department’s creation – 
including legislators and bureau employees – explicitly grasped how the merger threatened 
legacy mandates.  Third, key features in the legislative progression culminating in the creation of 
DHS – in particular, the President’s pledge of revenue neutrality and the White House’s 
willingness to consider including agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
Federal Aviation Administration – make little sense without assuming that the White House 
harbored the goal of affecting the performance of legacy mandates, even if doing so failed to 
yield a corresponding security benefit.  In light of these realities, senior Administration officials 
would have had to be willfully blind to ignore the merger’s effect on legacy mandates. 
From a prescriptive point of view, our conclusions are sobering.  Our analysis shows how 
the merger adversely affected even those legal mandates plainly relevant to homeland security.
17  
More generally, we explain how decisions about whether to create a new security agency, what 
scope and size to give it, and how to organize congressional jurisdiction over it are unlikely to 
have been driven primarily by meaningful prescriptive concerns.  Yet such decisions are also 
unlikely to be merely symbolic.  They can powerfully – and covertly – reshape how laws are 
implemented while making it more difficult for government to achieve broadly-shared 
prescriptive goals.  Marginal improvements depend on solving problems of legislative oversight, 
and on whether competent bureaucrats will improbably succeed in forging autonomy and 
                                                           
17 See infra Part III.e., Conclusion.  Our claim is not that DHS is entirely dysfunctional, or that it is responsible for 
the full extent of the disaster following the flooding in New Orleans that resulted from Hurricane Katrina.  Instead 
we contend that the prescriptive case for the creation of DHS is unpersuasive, that its creation entailed transition 
costs of uncertain duration and extent (a fact recognized even by many of its proponents), and that a plausible case 
can be made that specific difficulties – such as those faced by the TSA or FEMA during and after the Katrina crisis 
– were exacerbated by the creation of DHS.  Regarding the background degree of expert uncertainty permeating 
analyses of the policy implications of particular legal and policy changes, see PHILIP  E.  TETLOCK,  EXPERT 
POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2005). 6 
capacity in a world unlikely to support it.  While these scenarios remain elusive, our analysis 
does not yield a blanket condemnation of bureaucracies created through high-profile 
reorganizations.  Bureaucracies forged in crisis may not be inexorably doomed to fail in carrying 
out their legal responsibilities, and there may yet be reasons to defer to their legal interpretations.  
Instead, we highlight the difficulties in averting such failure. 
Our argument proceeds as follows.  Part I presents the homeland security story since just 
before September 11.  Part II develops our theory of bureaucratic organization and performance, 
with an emphasis on policy change in response to crises.  Part III applies the theory to the 
creation of DHS and related legislative enactments, providing empirical support for the 
theoretical conclusions. Our purpose there is not merely to demonstrate how the architecture of 
DHS was politicized, but to elucidate more specifically in what manner political considerations 
shaped the agency’s structure, and to what effect.  Part IV discusses extensions and implications.  
We conclude by discussing promising avenues for further research and noting that the prospects 
for improving homeland security depend crucially on understanding the political forces that 
constantly pervade, and often warp, the work of organizations entrusted with this crucial 
mandate.  
 
I. The Evolution of Homeland Security After September 11 
 
  Public bureaucracies decide where dams are built, whether nuclear power plants will add 
to energy production, how intelligence operations are conducted, who gets turned away at the 
border, and what environmental standards must be met.  As with the imaginary lines that 
subdivide metropolitan areas into distinct jurisdictions, enormous practical significance flows 
from the legal rules allocating power among bureaucracies.  Lurking behind the design of those 
rules may be a complex political story. 
In this Part, we begin tracing such a story, describing the interwoven origins of DHS and 
the Homeland Security Act (HSA), the sprawling statute from which the new department was 
forged.  We discuss the political context and substance of Act at length for two reasons.  First, 
our story contrasts with certain canonical descriptions of legislative developments following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, which tend to emphasize resolute presidential leadership and 7 
relative legislative passivity.
18  In contrast, our account reveals presidential policy reversals, the 
centrality of congressional bargaining even in the midst of a crisis, and the resulting statutory 
intricacies governing the new cabinet agency.  Second, certain puzzles emerge from the story of 
the Act and the Department, setting the stage for our analysis in the sections that follow.  
 A.  The Status Quo Before September 11 
The end of the Cold War dramatically affected debates about American security.  By the 
middle of 2001 American policymakers discussing security had replaced references to a balance 
of power, containment, and mutually assured destruction, focusing instead on terrorism, 
asymmetric warfare, and above all “homeland security.”
19  Terrorist attackers had struck several 
times during the previous eight years, most notably at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in 
Oklahoma City in 1995.
20  In response, the new president-elect created a structure within the 
White House National Security Council to coordinate matters involving terrorism, its prevention, 
and the nation’s ability to prepare and respond to such attacks.  Unlike previous directives, the 
focus was primarily on attacks targeting the United States itself.
21
The perceived need for coordination arose in part from the existence of numerous 
bureaus with responsibilities relevant to preventing, preparing for, and responding to manmade 
threats against the United States.
22  For instance, homeland security encompassed aspects of the 
                                                           
18 See, e.g., Julie Mason, White House Watch: Burnout on the Bush Team?, HOUSTON CHRON. A14, March 19, 2006, 
avail. at 2006 WLNR 4564959 (observing that after September 11, Congress kept a “rubber stamp” on hand for the 
White House); Lewis H. Lapham, Exit Strategies, HARPER’S MAG. 7 (January 1, 2006)(emphasizing the extent to 
which the post-September 11 era appears to involve “a cowed legislature”). 
19 The term was generally taken to refer to the security of the American homeland, its infrastructure and its 
population from a full range of manmade threats See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 
OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 7 (1999)(discussing funding for “domestic preparedness and homeland defense”), avail. at 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf (last accessed June 19, 2006); U.S.  COMMISSION ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY IN THE 21
ST CENTURY, SEEKING A NATIONAL STRATEGY: A CONCERT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND 
PROMOTING  FREEDOM  14  (2000)(describing “homeland defense” as a preeminent security goal), avail. at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseII.pdf (last accessed June 19, 2006). The reports of these high-level 
blue-ribbon panels contrast sharply with the prevailing rhetoric describing U.S. national security challenges a mere 
15 years earlier.  Compare Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 
(1996)(failing to emphasize terrorism or homeland security as preeminent security challenges), avail. at 
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/, last accessed June 19, 2006. 
20  See  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL  COMMISSION ON TERRORIST  ATTACKS  UPON THE UNITED  STATES  71-102 
(2004)(“Commission Report”). 
21 See id. 
22 See generally id.; U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL (2000)(describing separate law enforcement, national security, and 
disaster relief missions for different government agencies).   The identification of “homeland security” primarily 
with terrorism and similar manmade threats is derived from the Bush Administration’s own budget analyses.  See, 
e.g., Budget of the United States 23 (2003), avail. at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy03/pdf/bud05.pdf (“To 8 
work of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as the National Security Council.
23  
Rounding out the coterie of national security bureaucracies were agencies devoted to 
intelligence, criminal investigation, and prosecution.  The CIA’s explicit core function of 
intelligence combined with its covert operations.
24  By 2001, it had multiple task forces working 
on terrorism-related issues, and an elaborate group focused almost entirely on Osama Bin Laden 
and al Qaeda.
25  Specialized intelligence entities, such as the National Security Agency, further 
complemented these activities by engaging in electronic eavesdropping outside the Untied States 
and gathering considerable signals intelligence.  Homeland security and terrorism prevention 
were also considered the province of federal special agents and the law enforcement agencies for 
which they worked.  As hearings in three Senate committees during the week of May 7, 2001 
demonstrated, law enforcement agencies were routinely considered to be responsible for 
protecting the American public.
26  The FBI commanded vast budgets and statutory responsibility, 
serving as the lead counter-terrorism law enforcement agency.
27  Foreign attacks on American 
interests, such as the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, invariably led to the deployment of 
an FBI team.   
Several bureaus with regulatory, enforcement, and administrative responsibilities also 
performed missions relevant to homeland security.  A host of specialized law enforcement 
agencies existed, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).  The INS served multiple inspection, detention, 
investigation, quasi-adjudication, and policy functions related to controlling the flow of people 
into the country.  Customs had the similarly daunting task of preventing prohibited items, from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
develop the homeland security budget, the Office of Homeland Security… identified those activities that are 
focused on combating and protecting against terrorism and occur within the United States and its 
territories.”)(emphasis added).  By using this definition, we do not mean to imply that it is a reasonable one.  
Indeed, as indicated by our discussion below on Hurricane Katrina in Part III.e and our analysis of the prescriptive 
merits of the Department’s creation, there are considerable grounds for questioning the exclusion of major natural 
disasters from the definition of homeland security. 
23 See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 93-102. 
24 See id. at 88-91. 
25 See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 167-171 (2004).  
26 The Senate Armed Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence committees held hearings analyzing the work of the 
approximately forty different agencies responsible for combating domestic terrorism.  See, e.g., Testimony of Paul 
H. O’Neill, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Commerce, State, and the Judiciary, 2001 WL 47932 (F.D.C.H., May 8, 2001). 
27 See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 74 (“For countering terrorism, the dominant agency under Justice is the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation”).  Id. at 82 (“[T]he FBI and the justice Department… took on the lead role in 
addressing terrorism because they were asked to do so”). 9 
drugs to explosives, from entering.
28  Within the U.S. Treasury Department, Customs had the 
largest budget, staff, and responsibility.  Like INS, it performed more than just investigative 
functions (e.g., tracking down money launderers, drug traffickers, and illicit brokers of 
technology subject to export controls).  It also played a regulatory function.  While INS regulated 
the entry of people, Customs controlled the vast flow of goods into (and, in theory, out of) the 
United States.  The Secret Service investigated counterfeiting and fraud-related financial crimes 
in addition to serving its most visible role of protecting the President.  In addition to collecting 
excise taxes, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had become a law enforcement 
agency focused on firearms and explosives, with a wealth of technical expertise on these subjects 
unrivalled elsewhere in the federal government.
29  
Transportation and coastal security were handled largely through a tangle of overlapping 
functions nominally overseen from within the federal Transportation Department.  The FAA 
looked after security of the aviation infrastructure, imposing (among other things) mandates on 
airlines and airports requiring them to pay for employees to screen passengers and their luggage.  
The Coast Guard similarly shared with Customs responsibility for key aspects of port security.  It 
also performed coastal search and rescue operations along with a multitude of safety, rate-
setting, and environmental regulatory functions.
30   
Presumably, the work of these agencies could forestall a disaster that would have had to 
be handled by emergency response bureaucracies, who together formed the final pillar of 
homeland security – emergency response.
31  Of these, FEMA was the most important.  In 
addition to fielding emergency response teams and serving as a conduit for disaster relief money, 
FEMA also encompassed insurance programs to help mitigate the longer-term impact of various 
natural disasters.
32   
                                                           
28 Customs was also responsible for trade-related revenue collection and the implementation of hundreds of legal 
mandates related to trade regulation.  See Customs Service: Comments on Strategic Plan and Resource Allocation 
Process, Testimony of Norman Rabkin, Director, Admin. of Justice Issues, General Government Division, GAO T-
GGD 98-15 (Oct. 16, 1997), avail. at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98015t.pdf. 
29 See Commission Report, supra note 21, at 82 (“The ATF’s laboratories and analysis were critical…”). 
30 See U.S. Government Manual 308-335 (2000). 
31 See id. 
32 See Wamsley, Gary L. and Aaron D. Schroeder, Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of the 
Emergency Management Policy Subsystem, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 235 (1996).  These efforts complement those of 
state and local responders who are likely to nearly always be the first on the scene and to make up the bulk of the 
people responding to a terrorist attack.  See Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader, Organizing the Federal System for 
Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44, 46 (2002). 10 
Three features of the status quo characterized this mix of national security, law 
enforcement, regulatory, and disaster relief capability that would later be catalogued under the 
homeland security label.  First, policymakers assumed homeland security bureaucracies to be 
capable of operating reasonably effectively even though they had largely separate reporting 
structures and bureaucratic identities.  Though some legislators and independent commissions 
complained about the fragmentation of responsibility for security-related problems, legislators 
tolerated the decentralization of bureaucratic power over national and homeland security.
33  
Second, the description of agencies above demonstrates that virtually every bureaucratic unit that 
had a role to play in homeland security also had separate functions – such as INS’ role in 
providing immigration services – that were different in scope and therefore potentially in conflict 
with security.  Finally, enormous variation existed in the degree of coordination across relevant 
units.  Some problems were undeniable, such the relationship between the FBI and the CIA (and, 
for that matter, between the FBI and just about everyone else).  But there were also apparent 
successes, as when federal officials foiled a plot to bomb traffic tunnels leading into New York 
City and some of its major landmarks.   
B.  Shocks and Responses: The Immediate Aftermath. 
The administration’s initial response to the September 11 attack focused on proposing 
substantive legal changes.  Working groups at the Justice Department soon pulled together 
legislative proposals from preceding years to fashion an outline of what would become the USA 
Patriot Act.
34  The President also used his executive powers that could be deployed without 
legislative approval. The White House supported federal agents’ aggressive use of immigration 
and material witness authority to detain scores of people almost immediately following the 
attacks, and the President used his authority under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA) to block the assets of various individuals and organizations suspected of 
being tied to terrorists.
35   
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The White House staff also oversaw the implementation of two noteworthy changes in 
organizational structure, though its approach to each of demonstrated a great deal of caution 
about major changes in the allocation of bureaucratic jurisdiction.  On October 8, using existing 
statutory authority, the President created the position of homeland security advisor within the 
Executive Office of the President, and appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to fill it.  
Ridge sought to build a structure around his position to match the President’s ambitious rhetoric 
that the new Office of Homeland Security would “coordinate” policy by staffing a Homeland 
Security Council paralleling the structure of the National Security Council.
36   
An implicit presumption that underlay the creation of Ridge’s office concerned the value 
of coordinating separate agencies mixing homeland security missions with other functions.  A 
gap was presumed to exist not only in the provision of advice, but in the extent of coordination 
among a great many agencies and bureaus.
37  White House officials believed that success in the 
arena of homeland security depended on enhancing such coordination.
38  Ridge sought to provide 
that coordination, or at least the trappings of it.  But even delivering the image of greater 
coordination to the public proved daunting.  The National Counterterrorism Coordinator 
structure set up at the NSC now had a mandate overlapping that of the new Homeland Security 
Office.  There were no precedents for how to resolve the potential jurisdictional conflicts, nor 
was it obvious precisely what it meant for Ridge to coordinate, what his role would be in a crisis, 
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or whether the conflict between the NSC and the HSO would prove a major impediment to the 
goal of coordination.
39
Sensing disarray, some legislators insisted that the new Homeland Security Advisor 
should be subject to Senate confirmation and have statutory powers over budgets.  Senator Bob 
Graham, a Democrat from Florida, introduced S1449 to transform Ridge’s entity into a new 
National Office for Combating Terrorism to achieve the aforementioned purposes.  Other 
legislators went even further, reiterating occasional calls made earlier by selected legislators and 
blue-ribbon commissions for the creation of a new cabinet department focused on domestic 
security.
40
The President opposed these efforts.  Instead, White House aides emphasized the 
advantages of the status quo: no department, and a staff office to coordinate homeland security.  
From October 2001 until at least March of 2002, the President’s Press Secretary insisted that 
creating a cabinet department was unnecessary, and possibly counterproductive.
41  Unfortunately 
for the White House, the performance of the new Office during the anthrax attacks questioned 
the President’s argument that coordination had been sufficiently bolstered by the creation of 
Ridge’s Office.  During the anthrax episode, some observers described Ridge’s response as 
tentative and uncertain.
42  Despite the new Homeland Security Advisor’s declaration that he was 
in charge of the response, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson appeared to 
contradict Ridge.  During this period, despite the absence of formal budget authority, Ridge 
pressed for, and helped the White House achieve, a $1.2 billion increase in the immigration 
enforcement budget.
43
    A second structural change took shape in discussions between Congress and a reluctant 
White House regarding the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to consolidate responsibility 
                                                           
39 See Brill, supra note 21, at 54 (“[T]hat coordinating would be a lot harder than it sounded”); Kettl, Systems Under 
Stress, supra note 9, at __. 
40 See Alison Mitchell, A National Challenged: The Security Chief – Disputes Erupt on Ridge’s Needs for His Job, 
N.Y. TIMES p. 7 (Nov. 4, 2001). 
41 See Transcript of Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing, Oct. 2, 2001. 
42 See Victoria Sutton, Biodefense: Who’s In Charge? 13 Health Matrix 117 (2003).  
43 The Coast Guard also received a funding increase of $282 million in 2002. (Thessin, 2003).  See also infra Part III 
(discussing the pressures interfering with continued performance of the Coast Guard’s legacy missions following the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security). 13 
for transportation security.
44  With its creation in 2002, the Transportation Security Agency 
(TSA) assumed complicated responsibilities over the security of the nation’s transportation 
infrastructure.
45  The White House initially opposed the idea.  The President preferred to forego 
creating a new bureaucracy and to keep the screeners private.  Whether that opposition was 
rooted in ideology or in concern for the organized interests likely to be affected, the 
Administration later abandoned its reluctance and endorsed the idea. Some observers with access 
to the deliberation now report that the Administration’s acquiescence reflected not only 
mounting pressure from congressional Democrats but also the recognition that the mass public 
was unlikely to trust private screeners given their inability to prevent the hijackings.
46  The new 
law placed TSA within the Transportation Department.  The new agency’s creation was also 
accompanied by an initial dismemberment of the FAA’s security capacity (bitterly opposed by 
FAA), lodging it elsewhere at Transportation.   
C.  Initial White House Resistance to Reorganization 
    Well before September 11, a number of legislators and blue-ribbon commissions had 
called for consolidating some agencies with a homeland security mandate in a cabinet-level 
agency.
47  Various plans on Capitol Hill focused on three functions: border security and 
enforcement, disaster response functions relevant to terrorist attacks, and policymaking activities 
to facilitate the prevention of attacks.
48   
    Following the attacks, Senator Joseph Lieberman, then serving as Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee Chair, re-introduced legislation to centralize certain government functions 
into a single homeland security department.  While some Republican legislators, such as Arlen 
Specter, expressed some interest, the President did not.  He believed that such consolidation 
would constitute a waste of time at best.  On March 19, 2002, for instance, in response to a 
questioner who asked about “[w]hy… the White House continue[s] to resist the idea of making 
the Office of Homeland Security a Cabinet-level department,” Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
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insisted that: 
I’m not aware of a single proposal on Capitol Hill that would take every single one of 
those agencies [dealing with terrorism] out from their current missions and put them under 
Homeland Security.  So even if you took half of them out and put them under a Cabinet 
level Office of Homeland Security, the White House would still need, in the President’s 
estimation, an advisor on how to coordinate all the myriad of activities the federal 
government is involved in.  So creating a Cabinet office doesn’t solve the problem.  You 
still will have agencies within the federal government that have to be coordinated.
49
    Several factors might have made the creation of a new department seem problematic from 
the President’s perspective.  The substantive benefits of a consolidation were not obvious, 
indeed, highly uncertain – a point to which we return below.  Major changes were likely to 
provoke opposition from powerful legislators whose committees stood to lose some jurisdiction 
and from the interest groups they served.
50  Moreover, career officials and political appointees 
within the administration were likely to resist the transfer.  Opposition among the bureaucracy 
could have proven politically costly to the President,
51 increasing the risk that reorganization 
would backfire and potentially exposing the Administration to criticism in the press or on Capitol 
Hill.
52  Critics of previous reorganizations had, after all, pointed out that they had created such 
problems in the past.
53  Finally, to the extent that prescriptive concerns mattered at all 
(something we explore and question below), they might cut sharply against the sort of 
reorganization that might seem superficially appealing to the public.  Reorganizations almost 
inevitably cost money and create friction among people and organizations scrambling to 
understand the consequences of the new hierarchy under which they must work.  Moreover, 
reorganizations create new authority structures that typically engender friction which hinders one 
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of the main reasons for reorganization, namely, coordination.  
    Even in the midst of its crisis mode, White House aides may have appreciated certain risks 
inherent in taking responsibility for a massive reorganization. In the short run, there was a 
substantial chance that reorganization would actually decrease agencies’ effectiveness in 
responding to security threats, at a time when the Administration almost certainly persist or 
grow.  Though little is known about the impact of reorganizations on bureaucratic performance, 
it is widely acknowledged that performance suffers at the outset.
54  One account of the frantic 
days following September 11 underscores the extent to which these prescriptive concerns, 
intermingled with an appreciation of the political costs, were on the White House radar screen 
even two days after the terrorist attack: 
By Thursday, Abbot, Kuntz, and Libby [aides to Vice President Cheney] had concluded 
that the first thing the Bush administration should do would be not to reorganize all those 
agencies, but to hire a heavy weight to come work in the White House and coordinate 
them, much the way Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, coordinated the 
various agencies involved in foreign and defense policy.  They could never get all the 
agencies with some role in domestic security into one department, they reasoned, because 
so many also did so many other, unrelated jobs.  (FEMA, for example, administrates [sic] 
flood insurance in addition to coordinating the federal response to disasters.)  The goal 
should be to coordinate whatever they did related to homeland security, rather than spend a 
lot of time and money dislodging them from their current departments.
55
The White House emphatically followed that path, insisting that Ridge’s office fit the bill, 
coordinating both the sprawling federal security apparatus and the thousands of local police and 
fire departments, from Manhattan to Minnesota to Manhattan Beach, still scrambling to enhance 
security in their local jurisdictions.
56  
Despite the Democrats’ control of the Senate, Congress was broadly supportive of the 
President in the two months following the attack.  The Administration achieved rapid passage of 
the Patriot Act and a resolution authorizing the use of force abroad in response to the attacks.  
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Even individual Democratic legislators seemed initially inclined to cooperation.  Senator 
Graham, for example, agreed to his proposed legislation. The extent of congressional support 
contributed to an impression of considerable (if not frantic) policy change and implementation.  
The Administration’s burst of activity since September 11 – including the Patriot Act, the 
creation of a large new transportation security bureaucracy, the private sector’s thrust to crack a 
new homeland security market, state and local officials’ regional exercises, the invasion of a 
central Asian nation, and forging a new White House staff office – seemed to push the limits of 
what the nation’s political machinery could digest in such a short time.   
D.  Shaping a Reorganization and Striking Legislative Bargains 
But legislators were not entirely passive participants in the policymaking process.   
Emboldened by White House reluctance and public opinion surveys, a score of legislators called 
for a new cabinet department focused on homeland security.
57  White House aides thus 
encountered a more complex political terrain.  By late October 2001, Lieberman in the Senate 
and Republican Mac Thornberry in the House led what had begun as an unlikely (if not 
downright outlandish) crusade to forge agencies into a new super-bureaucracy that began to pick 
up support among both Republican and Democratic legislators.
58 The response from the White 
House through the rest of 2001 and early 2002 remained an emphatic “no.”   
    This negative response was not, however, the last word from the White House.  On June 7, 
President Bush unveiled his own proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security.
59  Hints 
that something was in the works had appeared since April, when Budget Director Mitch Daniels 
publicly stated that the President could propose reforms at a later date.
60  What Daniels did not 
say was that the President had already set the process in motion.  In late 2001 and early 2002, the 
President had several conversations with Ridge and Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the merits 
of creating a new department to administer homeland security.
61  Responding to congressional 
resistance to an earlier border consolidation plan, the president apparently noted the plan “seems 
kind of small to me,” and then added: 
You know, maybe we should stop getting pecked to death like this.  Maybe its time to 
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think big.  When you do something piecemeal, all the interests here come at you one by 
one and kill you.  Let’s just make believe we are re-created the government from scratch 
and map out what we’d put in a new homeland department and then maybe we’ll go for it 
[emphasis added].
62
    By March, aides to Ridge, Card, and Daniels were holding secret meetings.
63  Participants 
in the meetings now suggest that their deliberations were driven largely by prescriptive concerns 
about the organizational merits of consolidating various units.  The group was also driven by 
concerns about what could be sold on Capitol Hill, as underscored by the fact that the initial 
small group was soon expanded to include staff from the White House legislative affairs 
operation.   
    Although the limitations of sources describing these early meetings make it impossible 
determine the participants’ precise mix of concerns, the discussions soon yielded a rough picture 
of a department with two significant features.  First, it would be significantly larger in scope and 
size than anything that had been proposed by the Democrats or previous independent 
commissions.  “The PEOC group,” noted one commentator, “had now created a mega-agency 
that far exceeded Senator Lieberman’s relatively modest proposal for a Department of Homeland 
Security, and they weren’t finished.”
64  The working group demonstrated a willingness to 
contemplate an even larger department by their inclination to consider moving the FBI, the FAA, 
and ATF into the Department (moves that were ultimately rejected).  Precisely why the White 
House process contemplated and produced such a sprawling department is not immediately clear, 
a matter to which we return in Parts II and III.  Second, the PEOC group intended the new 
department to serve as a showcase for the value of flexibility in presidential control of personnel.  
The goal of watering down civil service protections appealed to the President’s aides, 
particularly Daniels.
65
    The 35-page legislative proposal that emerged from the meetings of the “PEOC group” 
sought to establish four primary “directorates” – border and transportation security, information 
analysis and critical infrastructure protection, science and technology, and preparedness and 
emergency response – at the core of the new department.  It included provisions allowing the 
President to appoint over a half-dozen assistant secretaries without Senate confirmation, and 
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sought to imbue the President with power to redistribute appropriations among several different 
agencies.  It called on political appointees to rewrite civil service protections governing many of 
the agency’s new employees and to replace them with a “flexible” system, presumably vesting 
greater power over career officials in the hands of political officials.
66  
    The plan’s starkest feature sought to move some 22 agencies into DHS, despite the fact 
that not all their functions conform to even the most expansive definition of homeland security.  
The marine environmental portions of the Coast Guard, for instance, were to be entirely absorbed 
by the new department, as were the revenue collection and trade enforcement functions of the 
Customs Service, and the agricultural regulatory functions of the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service.
67  
    In contrast, many previous proposals for the creation of a homeland security agency had 
contemplated more modest changes.  For example, Republican Representative Mac Thornberry’s 
pre-September 11 bill, introduced in March of that year, essentially contemplated moving 
FEMA, Customs, the Coast Guard and border patrol to the new agency.
68  Unlike the President’s 
plan, agencies like the Secret Service, APHIS, the investigative and regulatory functions of 
immigration authorities, health related functions such as the national vaccine stockpile, and 
Treasury’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center were left untouched.
69  T h e  
reorganization’s mixing a wide range of legacy missions with new homeland security 
responsibilities raised the question of how the tradeoffs were to be made across these missions.
70
    A flurry of activity followed the White House’s June 7 announcement.  The White House 
briefed Cabinet members (many of whom were just learning about the plan at that point) and 
legislative leaders.  The President’s aides spoke to the media.  And at 8pm Eastern Time, the 
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President spoke to the nation about the plan.
71  The elaborate roll-out confirmed that the 
President and his staff were now not only joining the chorus of support for the reorganization but 
sought to lead the reorganization drive.  The building blocks of the new proposal broke from past 
plans in the larger scope of agencies to be included and in the provisions weakening civil service 
rules.  Despite these differences, publicly the plan was premised on the same logic that the 
alternatives were: the value of centralization.  
    Behind the scenes, several factors may have helped dissipate the Administration’s previous 
resistance.  Its legislative affairs staff documented rising support for consolidation among 
legislators.
72  Security issues almost certainly continued holding much of the public’s attention, 
particularly given the congressional testimony of FBI “whistleblower” Colleen Rowley, who had 
unsuccessfully sought to get authority to search the computer of alleged terrorist Zacarias 
Moussaui, and continued public debate about whether an independent commission would 
ultimately be created to investigate the September 11 attacks.
73 The White House opposed that 
Commission too.  It might have seemed politically risky to the President and his aides to oppose 
the new department and an independent commission heading into the midterm congressional 
elections.  In addition, creating a new department may have had particularly strong political 
salience because of its appeal to latent, if potentially superficial, notions of effective 
governance.
74  But these developments fail to account for the choices the White House made 
regarding the size, scope, and prescriptive merits of the new agency. 
    The President’s June announcement found Congress still mired in divisions about the 
merits of creating a new department.  Support remained vigorous among members of the Senate 
Government Affairs committee, whose members had proposed renaming the committee 
“Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs” almost certainly stood to gain prestige, power, 
and influence to gain if their expectation were fulfilled and the new department was put under 
their jurisdiction.  At the same time, a stubborn core of opposition persisted among lawmakers 
who had committee jurisdiction to lose, or who saw position-taking opportunities in opposing 
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substantive civil service changes, earmarks, and liability protections in the President’s 
proposal.
75
    With both the President and a growing number of legislators supporting the broad goal of 
the department’s creation, there followed a period of intense bargaining.  In the House, Speaker 
Hastert and the Republican leadership created a two-track process to evaluate the bill, christened 
the “Homeland Security Act.”  Over a dozen committees with existing jurisdiction over various 
aspects of homeland security would mark up the bill, but their votes would be considered 
advisory in nature.  Meanwhile, Hastert would empanel a Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, including most of the chairs of existing committees with jurisdiction over homeland 
security, to make final decisions on the House version.
76
    Hastert’s move is understandable.  If the leadership had left the decisionmaking solely to 
the existing standing committees with existing authority, they were likely to oppose the major 
reorganization that the President was now publicly committed to support and a growing chunk of 
the public appeared to support. Alternatively, if Hastert created his own handpicked committee, 
existing members and committees would likely be opposed to the result. 
    The markups revealed widespread concern among the committees regarding potential 
changes in their jurisdiction.  For example, the House Judiciary Committee voted to transfer the 
Secret Service to the Justice Department (over which it had jurisdiction) instead of letting it go to 
the new cabinet agency.  The House committee with jurisdiction over transportation issues 
sought (like the one in the Senate) to prevent or delay moving the new Transportation Security 
Agency to the new department.  And many committees sought to limit the presidential powers in 
the new bill, such as those allowing the White House to appoint assistant secretaries without 
Senate confirmation.  
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    Although the first stage of advisory markups appears symbolic since the Select Committee 
would have final say, the procedure resulting in these votes could also be understood serving a 
critical information collecting device for party leaders who favored the reorganization.  The 
House leadership appeared inclined to support the President’s push for reorganization. 
Nonetheless, the membership was likely to be quite wary of a wholesale redistribution of power 
within the legislature, which was an almost inevitable consequence of the reorganization 
legislation.  The markups thus allowed the committees to reveal what portions of the proposed 
changes were politically most costly to them and which were less so.  The Select Committee 
could then take these committee actions into account in its decisions, either by incorporating the 
committees’ changes or by searching for other means to assuage the committees’ ostensible 
concerns.  The Select Committee reported its version of the HSA on July 19, 2002, on a straight 
5-4 party-line vote.  This legislation became the basis for the final bill, described below, and 
passed the full house on July 26, 2002.
77
    Partisan divisions on the House Select committee foreshadowed greater conflict in the 
Senate, where Democrats controlled the chamber by a tiny margin.  Already, the President’s June 
announcement had probably begun to blunt the perception, which Senator Lieberman had 
intensely sought to foster, that creating the new super-agency was a Democratic initiative.   
Lieberman now sought to recapture the initiative.  In late July, the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee approved a Lieberman-sponsored version of the homeland security bill (S2452) with 
civil service provisions more acceptable to the Democrats and provisions transforming Ridge’s 
existing office at the White House into an Office of Counterterrorism with a director subject to 
Senate Confirmation.  The Senate then received the House version of the HSA (HR5005), which 
allowed the President, among other things, the power to exempt parts of government from 
federal labor management relations statutes.
78  Lieberman and his allies sought to substitute his 
new bill for the House version.  But Senator Phil Gramm filibustered cloture motions to limit 
debate.
79  In the end, Senate Democrats were unable to pass a cloture motion to force a vote on 
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their preferred version of the bill, which would have triggered a House-Senate conference on the 
creation of the new department.  And they were unwilling to compromise on the civil service 
provisions.  Thus, when the midterm elections arrived, the Senate had not agreed to support the 
President’s and the House Republican leadership’s version of the HSA.  Ironically, the 
Democrats were exposed to the charge that they opposed the creation of a Department that they 
had played such a key role in forcing the President to accept.
80   
    The elections brought further unwelcome news for the Democrats, who lost the Senate and 
were dealt an even more lopsided minority in the House.  After a final attempt to strip provisions 
allowing the President to suspend collective bargaining protections, the Democrats compromised 
and allowed cloture to be invoked in the Senate by a vote of 83 to 16 on November 19, 2002.  
The Senate then passed the House bill with minor amendments that were approved in the House 
by voice vote, and the bill was sent to the President on November 22, 2002.
81
E.  The Final Bill 
    When the President declared victory three days later, he signed a bill that was far more 
detailed than what the White House had proposed.  The details reflected protracted presidential 
bargaining with Congress.  On the surface, the final bill established a department that was quite 
similar to what President Bush had proposed.  Consistent with the President’s proposal, the core 
functions of the department were grouped into four directorates: Border and Transportation 
Security (including the bulk of the agency’s employees and resources), Intelligence and 
Infrastructure Protection (incorporating some of the smaller infrastructure protection offices 
absorbed from Commerce and the FBI), Science and Technology (including the Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, or HSARPA, initially projected to administer a 
$500 million fund supporting innovative research and development projects), and Preparedness 
(primarily FEMA) (Senate Govt. Affairs Committee, 2002).
82  As Table 1 indicates, not every 
                                                           
80 See Clarke, supra note 26, at 249-250.   
81 With respect to civil service provisions, law gave the president most of what he sought, including the power to 
abrogate, for a period of up to five years, many civil service protections for key DHS employees.  HR 5005 
(“Homeland Security Act,” or “HSA”), Section 841(a)(2).  The law allows the Secretary, in conjunction with the 
Director of OPM, to prescribe a “human resource management system” for the Department, waiving civil service 
provisions governing compensation, evaluation, reward, and punishment of employees. 
82 Despite the rich variety of functions suggested by the existence of these four directorates, nearly 90% of the new 
department’s employees and 65% of its budget were in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 
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agency that the White House working group considered placing within the Department ended up 
in the new agency.  The sprawling agency had nonetheless come to encompass functions ranging 
from international child labor investigations to marine fuel leaks, and included nearly every 
entity that the President ultimately proposed to move into the new agency. 
 
Table 1:  Selected Agencies Considered for Transfer to DHS
83
 
Bureau considered for 
transfer (in bold if not 
slated for transfer before 





definition focused on 






Animal Plant and Health 
Inspection Service 
(Agriculture) 
(Capable of providing 
personnel for the 
support of inspections at 
the border) 
Regulate the movement 
of animals and plants 
into and out of the 
country (affecting 
individuals, small 
businesses, and large 
agribusiness interests) 
YES (partial; 





U.S. Secret Service 
(Treasury) 
Protect top U.S. 
government officials, 
provide security at high-
profile public events 
Investigate financial 
fraud (“wire” and 





U.S. Coast Guard 
(Transportation) 




emergencies, can be 








ships and companies 
owning ships) 
Setting rates for the use 
of marine facilities and 
waterways; 
Setting rules for the use 




(oil and chemical spills, 
marine water pollution 
YES 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
HEARINGS  BEFORE  SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY,  TERRORISM, AND GOVERNMENT  INFORMATION,  SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 107
th Cong, 2002, (Statement of Ivo Daalder). 
83 Sources: Brill, supra note 21 (describing the White House PEOC group’s deliberations); President’s Proposed 
Homeland Security Act (describing the agencies the President sought to move into the new department); HR 5005 
(listing agencies actually included in the new agency); U.S. Government Manual (2002)(describing agency 
functions). 24 
rules); 





(separated into: Bureau of 
Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, an 
investigative bureau 
merged with portions of 
Customs, and a border 
enforcement and 
administration bureau 
merged with portions of 
Customs)(Justice) 












FEMA (independent)  Disaster relief and 
recovery services in 
response to terrorist 
attacks 
Disaster relief and 
recovery services in 
response to natural 







U.S. Customs Service 
(separated into: Bureau of 
Customs and Border 
Protection, encompassing 
portions of INS focused on 




Customs and INS criminal 
investigation 
functions)(Treasury) 
Inspections at the 






Tariff and trade-related 
tax enforcement; 
Write and enforce 
elaborate trade 
regulations, including 
those involving child or 
forced labor, 
environmental 






Promote private sector 
activities to protect 
critical infrastructure 
from terrorist attacks  
Encourage private sector 
activity to protect 
critical infrastructure 






and respond to 
manmade threats to 
critical infrastructure 
Minimal YES 










Bureau of Alcohol,  Explosives enforcement  Collection of excise  NO (moved to 25 
Tobacco, and Firearms 
(Treasury) 
(regulation and criminal 
investigation 
 
taxes on alcohol, 
















Aviation security  Regulating air traffic 
and aviation safety 
NO (left at 
Transportation; 
left out of 
President’s 
plan) 
State Department Visa 
Processing Functions 
Screen visa applications 
(including those 
requested by potential 
terrorists) 
Screen visa applications 
(including those 





















vulnerability of nuclear 
powerplants to terrorist 
attacks, safeguarding of 
nuclear materials used 
for civilian applications 
in the United States 
Regulation of nearly all 
aspects of the civilian 
nuclear industry, 
including licensing of 
new nuclear reactors and 
civilian nuclear 
technologies, health and 
safety regulation of the 
ongoing use of nuclear 
technologies 
NO 
    Despite the White House’s relative success, the legislative bargaining process also 
introduced some important changes. The final Homeland Security Act contained nearly two 
hundred separate legislative provisions (with some individual provisions stretching over a half-
dozen pages).  In contrast, the President’s original proposal contained fewer than fifty sparsely-
written provisions focusing primarily on the structure of the four aforementioned directorates.  
This disparity reflects complexities lurking beneath the surface of the HSA.   
    Unlike the original White House bill, for instance, the resulting HSA simultaneously 
included language explicitly emphasizing the importance of non-homeland security missions 
along with the terrorism-focused language (Section 101) and provisions establishing the 
Secretary’s power over the bureaus (Section 102).  It could not have been lost on legislators that 26 
the first three of the Department’s six functions concerned terrorism.  At the same time, 
lawmakers supplemented the blanket entreaty for the new Department to “ensure that the 
functions of the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department that are not related directly to 
securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of 
Congress” with more specific agency specific language.  In the case of the Coast Guard, 
legislators actually allowed some (ostensibly limited) diminution of non-homeland security 
functions, but sought to monitor changes in its non-security regulatory and safety missions by 
requiring regular reports from the Inspector General and the Secretary (Section 888).  The HSA 
also contained similarly-detailed provisions governing a plethora of other agencies transferred to 
the new department, specifying (for example) that some revenue-collection regulatory functions 
of Customs would remain at Treasury (Section 412) while the Secretary of Homeland Security 
could administer others,
84 and providing that FEMA should carry out an “all hazards” mission 
while simultaneously allowing the Secretary the flexibility to refocus FEMA’s actual operations 
(Section 507).   
    The resulting bill also denied to the White House many of the sweeping presidential 
powers contained in the original proposal.  Despite the presence of united Republican 
government, the bill did not allow the White House to directly control the timing of agency 
transfers, to redistribute appropriations among different agencies, and to appoint assistant 
secretaries without Senate confirmation.  The HSA also created a host of research institutes and 
centers of excellence with mandates to focus on exceedingly broad conceptions of homeland 
security (including, for example, one center focused on developing new prison-related 
technologies)(Sections 231-237; 312-313).  Over time these institutions would almost certainly 
                                                           
84 This provision is illustrative of the legislative compromises simultaneously including language emphasizing the 
importance of legacy mandates while actually conferring greater authority on executive officials.  The revenue 
provision does not allow Treasury to retain exclusive control over the revenue-related regulatory functions of 
Customs.  Under the HSA, the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to delegate these functions to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, and – where such delegation has not occurred – must consult with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security on the performance of these functions (Section 412(a)(1)).  Thus, even if the Secretary of the Treasury 
chose not to delegate any of these powers, the law allows Treasury to wield its tariff-related regulatory authority 
only in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, moreover, 
retains considerable discretion to set enforcement priorities at Customs despite language in Sections 413-417 placing 
limited restrictions on the Secretary’s ability to directly diminish or discontinue revenue-related functions.  For 
example, while the Secretary may not directly “reduce the staffing level, or reduce the resources attributable to” 
functions performed by Customs’ dedicated revenue and trade staff, the Secretary appears to retain authority to 
affect the priorities of the more than 20,000 employees under the Office of Field Operations that administer ports of 
entry, thereby changing the amount of information produced about potential revenue and trade violations.  27 
serve as conduits for federal spending benefiting particular regions or industries.
85
    Finally, the legislation accomplished a proliferation of other goals, many of which were 
initially addressed in separate legislative proposals.  For instance, although the Justice 
Department lost virtually all its immigration enforcement power when INS was transferred into 
the new Department, it gained most of Treasury’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(Title XI).  Pilots gained a right to be armed (Title XIV).  Airlines obtained new insurance and 
financial protections (Title XII), and the Department gained new regulatory powers to protect 
manufacturers of “anti-terrorism” technologies from liability (Sections 861-865).
86
    Together these features evince the importance of four recurring themes associated with the 
legislative bargaining process.  First, although the new bill granted the Secretary of Homeland 
Security sweeping powers of “direction, authority, and control” over the new Department 
(Section 102), legislators recoiled from granting the President the sweeping powers he had 
requested to reallocate appropriations, appoint assistant secretaries without confirmation, and 
control the timing of agency transfers.  Second, legislators showed predictable interest in creating 
conduits for the transfer of federal money to particular regions or industries – in short, pork 
barrel.  Third, lawmakers used the fast-moving HSA to advance discrete legislative projects that 
allowed them to signal desirable positions to the public (as with the provision arming pilots) or 
achieve major substantive policy goals sought by organized interests (such as the expansion in 
airline liability protections). Fourth, even as they ultimately voted for legislation that transferred 
major agencies into a new bureaucracy, legislators insisted on asserting control over those 
agencies by including provisions governing how those agencies were supposed to discharge their 
missions.  In particular, legislators showed some awareness that the new department would – true 
to its name – emphasize homeland security over a plethora of legacy missions.  In response, 
lawmakers made modest efforts to stress the continued importance of the agencies’ myriad non-
homeland security responsibilities.
87
                                                           
85  See  Homeland Security Act, supra note __.  The extent to which legislators across parties collaborated in 
restraining White House efforts to expand the scope of presidential power illustrates the potential willingness of 
legislators to prioritize institutional prerogatives (which can translate into policymaking power and electoral 
advantage) despite partisan differences.  For a contrary perspective, playing down the possibility of cross-party 
institutional interests, see Daryl J. Levinson and Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2311 (2006). 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 28 
  Equally noteworthy is what the bill omitted – congressional organization.  Section 1503 
described the “sense of Congress that each House… should review its committee structure in 
light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of 
the Department,” but the bill required no changes in structure.  Thus, as tens of thousands of 
inspectors, agents, and government employees began a long journey towards their positions in 
the new agency in late November 2002, the congressional oversight structure over the 
department’s components remained largely unchanged.
88
    Earlier the White House had sought to bolster its reorganization plan by arguing that too 
many congressional committees were involved in overseeing homeland security.
89  It now 
acquiesced to a status quo-driven congressional oversight structure.  Although the Senate’s 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee appears to have gained some degree of 
jurisdiction at the expensive of other committees, the Senate’s Appropriations, Judiciary, Armed 
Services, and Finance Committees (among others) all retain substantial homeland security 
oversight responsibilities.  In the House even less centralization occurred in the legislative 
oversight structure.  The relative preservation of the status quo in the House probably indicated 
the leadership’s reaction to the repeated standing committee “advisory” markups seeking to limit 
the size and scope of the new department.  Although such votes had not succeeded in limiting the 
scope of the sprawling new department, little had changed with respect to congressional 
oversight as late as mid-2004: 
In reality, jurisdiction [over DHS] in both chambers remains allocated to dozens of 
committees and subcommittees.  From January to June 2004, DHS officials testified 
before 126 hearings, or about 1 ½ per day of legislative session, not including briefings or 
other meetings.  Secretary Ridge estimated that he has been called to appear before 80 
different committees and subcommittees on the Hill.
90
Potential problems with congressional oversight did little to dampen the political 
enthusiasm for the new Department when it finally opened its doors in mid-2003.  The President 
                                                           
88 See Kettl, Systems Under Stress, supra note 9 at __.  See also Quelling Qualms on Security, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS 12A (Jan. 9, 2005), avail. at 2005 WLNR 24731284 (discussing House committees’ reluctance to yield turf to 
the newly permanent Homeland Security Committee); Balancing Civil Liberties and National Security Needs, 
TESTIMONY OF MARY  A.  FETCHET,  FOUNDING  DIRECTOR,  VOICES OF SEPTEMBER  11
TH,  BEFORE THE HOUSE 
GOVERNMENT REFORM (June 7, 2006), avail. at 2006 WLNR 9751148 (“In the current structure, most congressional 
committees have some jurisdiction over homeland security, making the current system prone to turf battles and 
inertia… everyone is in charge so no one is in charge”) 
89 See President’s Plan, supra note 67. 
90 Thomas M. Susman, Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security, 30-FALL ADMIN. & REG. NEWS 2 (2004). 29 
had switched from opposing the merger to fashioning – with legislative allies – a new homeland 
security agency larger than anything previously proposed.  Neither the Administration nor 
members of Congress involved in forging the department expressed much uncertainty about well 
this sprawling arrangement would function.  But history would soon extinguish any certainty 
about the legislation’s merits. 
 
II. Updating Political Theories of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance: The 
Political-Bureaucratic System 
 
  To understand the creation of DHS, we must begin by considering what politicians want 
to accomplish when they bargain over the creation of a new bureaucracy.  Over the past three 
decades, political scientists have developed a new approach to studying questions of bureaucratic 
performance and organization.
91 This perspective emphasizes a series of non-obvious 
implications about bureaucratic structure, incentives, and performance. In contrast to the 
traditional literature on bureaucracy,
92 which primarily seeks to explain bureaucratic inefficiency 
from what could be called an “internalist” perspective focusing largely on the goals and routines 
of the bureaucracy itself, the new approach discussed here places greater emphasis on explaining 
inefficiency from an “externalist” perspective – one based on factors in a bureaucracy’s political 
environment, especially the various legislation it faces.
93
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of Organizational Evolution, 33  PUB.  ADMIN.  REV.  300  (1973);  JAMES  G.  MARCH AND HERBERT  A.  SIMON, 
ORGANIZATIONS  (1993);  PHILIP  SELZNICK,  TVA AND GRASSROOTS:  A  STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL 
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93 The “internalist” literature is not without value.  For instance, March and Simon’s account of bounded rationality 
within organizations almost certainly explains why, even in the absence of external constraints, bureaucratic actors 
create routines that distort organizations’ ability to respond to their environment.  Indeed, the strategic political 
action characteristically associated with the external perspective may interact with the internalist dynamics, as when 30 
  This Part uses the preceding insights about the importance of external political dynamics 
to develop a theory explaining the creation and performance of bureaucracies such as DHS.  Our 
approach refines existing theories by better accounting for the impacts of crises and uncertainty 
about the prescriptive effects of reorganization.  These refinements allow us to better understand 
the political design of legal mandates in other contexts arising throughout history. 
The basic outline of our theory can be summarized briefly.  First, interest groups have 
influence on the process because they affect the reelection prospects of political officials.
94  
Interest group activity implies a bias toward those groups who are active. But this influence is 
not simply general influence. It works through the political system. Interest groups in the 
President’s support constituency have more influence than those who are not. Similarly, those 
interests closely connected with important members on the relevant congressional subcommittees 
that oversee various agencies have more influence. Second, a range of inter-branch dynamics 
shape the legislative process.  As lawmakers bargain, key legislators negotiate with organized 
interest groups and with the president.  The resulting congressional process – combining internal 
negotiations among legislators, pressure from outside interest groups, and bargaining with the 
president – puts its distinctive stamp on both bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic incentives. 
Third, a range of intra-branch politics affects design, involving both bureaucratic politics within 
the executive branch as well as congressional bargaining among committees and among 
legislators with different vested interests in the existing structure. Fourth, mass politics affects 
design. Differences in how attentive and informed is the public affect the induced preferences of 
representatives over various institutional design questions. Fifth, a crisis dramatically transforms 
public attentiveness and can therefore dramatically change the political pressures on a give issue.  
Together these factors interact in potentially complex ways.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
politicians deliberately place an organizational sub-unit within a larger agency whose mission may shape the sub-
units priorities in politically desirable ways (hence, for example, the placement of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, or OFAC, in the Treasury Department, an environment likely to make OFAC more sensitive to private 
sector concerns than had the agency been placed within the Justice or State Departments).  Cf. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 
supra note 7.  Nonetheless, as we note above, there is reason to question the extent to which a purely internalist 
focus can give a compelling account of public organizations and the hurdles they face, in general, and of the 
evolution of major federal reorganizations such as those affecting homeland security, in particular.  By definition, 
legislative decisions about structure involve a host of external political actors with competing agendas. 
94 See Moe, Politics of Bureaucratic Structure supra note 92, at 289. 31 
A.  A Theory of Legislation: Inconsistent Objectives 
  The civics textbook view of national legislation is that it is designed to solve various 
social, economic, and security problems.
95  In practice, legislation rarely addresses these 
problems particularly well when measured against the standard of what politicians publicly claim 
their goals to be. The reason is politics. First, as designed by the founders, the separation of 
powers system assures that the two houses of Congress and the president have different electoral 
constituencies and therefore respond to different interests. The different constituencies lead 
officials in the different branches to favor different ways to address each policy issue. Second, 
legislation requires majority support, granting majority (and sometimes filibuster or veto-
override) pivots bargaining power. Third, each house of Congress has a range of institutions 
whose effect are to grant further bargaining leverage and veto gates over legislation, notably, 
committees and the majority party leadership. 
  All these institutional features of national politics combine to grant bargaining power to a 
range of legislators with divergent goals. Routinely, these legislators use their leverage to alter 
the legislation in ways that benefit their constituents who may have very narrow interests or 
interests that conflict with the overall goals of the legislation. Below we will survey a series of 
implications that congressional institutions have for the shape of legislation. For now, we 
mention one that we believe is the most important, namely, the effects of political compromise 
on the shape of legislation. 
  Typically, legislation begins with proponents who favor legislation that addresses a 
particular problem.
96 Often, the initial legislation is designed efficiently in the sense that, given 
the sponsors’ definition of the problem, the legislative proposal addresses the problem directly. 
This proposal is often relatively short. More importantly, the proposal typically has little chance 
of passing in this form. In opposition to the legislation’s sponsors are the opponents who see to 
preserve the status quo by defeating the legislation in any form.   
                                                           
95 See, e.g., KENNETH PREWITT, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1977).  Traces of this perspective 
can also be found in legal scholarship emphasizing the virtues of representative political institutions.  Cf. JOHN 
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  Although most popular accounts depict legislative struggles between the legislation’s 
proponents and opponents, a critical – indeed, pivotal – third group exists; namely, the 
moderates. As the moderate go – for or against – so goes the legislation. To succeed, a bill’s 
sponsors must bargain with the moderates for their support. The inherent need to negotiate to 
pass legislation implies that nearly all successful congressional legislation is the product of 
legislative compromise between the bill’s sponsors and the moderates. Moderates generally seek 
to pass a weaker form of the legislation, a bill that simply does less of what the sponsors 
originally proposed. Typically, compromise the brings the moderates on board requires limits on 
the legislation, including restrictions, exceptions, and cumbersome procedures that afford 
interested parties the ability to contest or delay the implementation of the legislation’s effects. 
These provisions often compromise the legislation’s purpose in the sense that they make it 
harder.
97
  An example: In the mid-1970s, environmentalists sought to control sulfur-dioxide 
emissions, a major source of which was sulfur in coal burned to generate electricity. To reduce 
these emissions, utilities could either switch to low-sulfur coal or add “scrubbers” to their waste 
stacks that would eliminate the sulfur from the exhaust emissions.  Although the prescriptively 
optimal way to address the problem would have been to allow some utilities to burn low sulphur 
coal instead of installing scrubbers, this approach engendered political opposition because it 
endangered union jobs in the high sulfur coal regions.  In the end, supporters of the legislation 
agreed to compromise with the representatives of the unionized coal regions to require that every 
utility in the country – regardless of whether they burned high or low sulfur coal – add scrubbers. 
This requirement at once raised the cost of removing sulfur from emissions, lowered the overall 
environmental cleanup per dollar spent, but saved union jobs.
98
In short, major legislation often approaches incoherence, in the sense that it contains 
provisions designed to address a particular problem along with provisions that limit the efficacy 
of those solutions in the form of exceptions, exemptions, limitations, and cumbersome 
procedures.
99  The latter provisions meant to qualify the act are a necessary feature of the 
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legislation: without them, the legislation would not pass. Put differently, members of Congress 
knowingly pass an incoherent measure, in the sense that its provisions are internally inconsistent 
to the point of profound ambiguity, when they would not be able to pass the more coherent 
version. 
B.  The Political-Bureaucratic System: Institutional Solutions to Delegation Problems. 
i.  The Imprint of Legislative and Executive Politics on the Delegation of Statutory Authority to 
Bureaucracies 
  The divisions among legislators – and between specific legislators and executive branch 
officials – discussed above have predictable implications for the production of statutes and the 
structure of the bureaucracies that implement statutes.  In particular, previous research identifies 
the following factors as especially likely to shape legislative bargaining when lawmakers are 
divided about their goals. The general consequence of this system is goal distortion, or the 
process by which politics inevitably distort the goals of the legislation as legislators transform a 
proposal into a vehicle that will pass Congress. 
  (1) The distributive tendency and goal distortion.  An inevitable effect of the 
legislative process is that benefits from a program must be widespread or the program will not 
gain sufficient support to pass. Consider legislation designed to alleviate poverty. If the proposal 
does this efficiently, it will concentrate resources in states and congressional districts with high 
concentrations of poor people. Because poor people are a relatively small minority of the country 
– perhaps fifteen percent – the legislation concentrates resources in a small number of 
congressional districts. This concentration also means that the legislation will have difficulty 
passing. A small minority of districts gain by the legislation, while most legislation gain little 
while bearing the tax costs of the program.  
  In reaction to the problem of passage, bill sponsors have a tendency to distribute the 
funds more widely than efficiency dictates. This distributive tendency implies a high likelihood 
of goal distortion.
100  By distributing the funds from a program more widely, this tendency 
breaks the link between the legislative solution and the problem the program is designed to 
address. Programs regularly distribute funds widely in a way that distorts their purpose.  Some 
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examples include the space program, various urban and housing programs, the Department of 
Energy’s National Laboratory system, and (as discussed below) DHS’ programs to fund 
emergency preparedness grants as well as research and development.
101
  (2) Multiple veto points. We have already seen that the need to command a majority 
typically implies legislative compromise that affects both the legislation’s goals and the means 
by which it addresses those goals. Other aspects work in the same way. 
  First, at least two committees (one in the House, and one in the Senate) share jurisdiction 
on any given issue, and often many more committees have somewhat overlapping jurisdiction.  
Because of these multiple veto points, members can sometimes hold up legislation desired by 
others as bargaining leverage over legislative issues wholly independent of the legislation. 
During the consideration of the early legislation addressing the savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s, both house and senate passed versions of legislation aimed at mitigating the growing 
problem that would ultimately cost taxpayers several hundred billion dollars. Both versions of 
the bill contained similar provisions addressing the crisis.  But a compromise failed because 
House committee members had added different add-ons to the legislation than had the Senate 
committee members. Because the two committees could not agree on how to compromise these 
additional parts, the legislation died in 1986, allowing the problem to mushroom.
102   
  Second, another type of intra-chamber conflict concerns the distribution of power and 
authority within the chamber. Committee members typically seek to enhance the discretion, 
scope, and authority of their committees, even at the expense of others.
103  For example, when a 
new issue arises that does not readily fit with the existing pattern of authority, members on 
different committees jockey for control of this issue. Energy provides the canonical example. 
Prior to the energy crisis of 1973, energy was a relatively minor issue. With the energy crisis, it 
suddenly became a national issue. Within each chamber, a wide range of committees sought to 
control a piece of this issue. Indeed, negotiations over how to divide this authority within each 
chamber delayed a national response to the crisis for several years, from 1973 until 1977. 
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  The upshot is simple.  As new policy issues emerge and as political support for existing 
issues changes, committees negotiate over who has authority on a given issue or a given aspect 
of an issue. Because the policy preferences on the different committee jockeying for power can 
often be quite different, different allocations of authority within the chamber have significant 
policy implications.  
  (3) Congressional jurisdictions. Congressional committees and subcommittees are 
intimately involved in bureaucratic oversight.
104 These bodies are not only each chamber’s 
agents charged with overseeing a bureaucracy’s implementation of policy, but they put their own 
stamp of interest on the direction of that policy.  
  To an important degree, the structure of Congress parallels the structure of the 
bureaucracy, and vice versa. They work together. Moreover, complex policies, such as the 
environment and energy, are often divided into a great many pieces, with different 
subcommittees overseeing different portions of a bureaucracy’s activities.
105
  Because members on the different subcommittees have different interests, they pull 
policymaking within their domain in different directions. For policies that are completely 
independent, this is fine, but when the policies interact – as they must, for example, because of 
budgetary tradeoffs – the inconsistent views on different subcommittees can create potential 
problems. 
  These interactions plainly have implications for bureaucratic reorganization. Consider a 
set of bureaus that work on related policies but were created by different legislation and are 
overseen by different subcommittees or committees. They are likely to pursue different types of 
goals, in part because the legislative creating them differs and in part because the interests of the 
members of the relevant subcommittees differ. 
  Suppose that the president seeks to achieve efficiency gains by coordinating the bureaus 
activities though a bureaucratic reorganization that combines the two. The degree to which these 
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efficiency gains are realized in practice depends in part on whether there is a parallel 
congressional reorganization. Allowing the two separate subcommittees to retain jurisdiction 
over the different pieces of the now reorganized bureau impedes coordination: the different 
interests on the two subcommittees lead them to continue to pull the two portions of the 
reorganized bureau in different directions. Members of each subcommittee face a common pool 
problem: both prefer the efficiency gains, yet both prefer more benefits from their own portion of 
the whole. Because they control only their portion, each has a tendency to take more for itself. 
To the extent that coordination achieves an increase in benefits that comes at the extent of one of 
these pieces, members of the relevant subcommittee will use their oversight powers to work 
against coordination. In contrast, if the congressional jurisdictions are also reorganized so that 
one subcommittee now gains sole jurisdiction over the bureau, it will better able make a coherent 
tradeoffs between the two activities and hence to realize the efficiency gains. 
  (4) Partisan electoral goals. A fourth principle relevant for bureaucratic structure is that 
the two national parties have incentives to use legislation to enhance their members’ electoral 
goals at the expense of the other. Parties with majorities in Congress typically have the 
advantage.   
  A particular instance of partisan warfare is “baiting” the opposition on popular 
legislation. Suppose the public is strongly supportive of some legislation. Because voters rarely 
follow or understand legislative details, the majority party has an incentive to add extreme 
components to popular legislation in an effort to bait the minority. They do so in hope that 
members of the opposition will object to or obstruct the legislation because of these features. 
Often, the public fails to understand the nuances and instead sees the opposition as simply 
objecting to the legislation. This gives an electoral issue to majority party candidates who 
challenge opposition incumbents. Sure, the incumbent will try and explain – “I would have 
supported the legislation, but this one feature made it objectionable.” Sometimes that works, but 
sometimes it simply sounds like an excuse, one that fails to convince voters. 
ii.  Two Theoretical Refinements. 
  Despite its usefulness in understanding the broad outlines of how statutes and 
bureaucracies are designed by the legislature, existing work largely leaves out some crucial 
elements; notably, the role of crises and uncertainty.  Consider each in turn. 37 
 (1) The Role of Crises.  For our purposes a crisis is (a) an exogenous shock sharply 
raising demand for policy changes in a particular domain that (b) is costly for politicians to 
ignore.   
A political crisis has four interrelated effects on the forces underlying bureaucratic 
creation and structure.  First, it implies a far more attentive public.  Although the public cannot 
attend to the policy details, an attentive public pressures political officials to address the problem 
underlying the crisis.
106  Second, as a consequence of public attentiveness, interest groups often 
have less power to protect their interests. Whereas interest groups may predominate in the 
relevant policies areas prior to a crisis – in part because of relatively inattentive public or because 
the portion of the public that is attentive is a small subset of the larger population – a crisis that 
brings public attention provides a new set of rewards for public officials to counterbalance the 
rewards generated by interest groups. In some cases this change allows new interest groups to 
become relevant, as in contractors following a widely publicized natural disaster.
107 Third, a 
crisis typically means a far greater urgency than in most policy areas so that political officials 
must act fast; failing to do so will leave political officials electorally vulnerable for having failed 
to address such a critical issue in a timely fashion. Finally, these effects are sometimes most 
pronounced for the president in the sense that he is seen as the national leader.
108
  Taken together, these four effects have several implications for a crisis response. First, 
this response is sometimes (and perhaps often) ill-considered. Because an attentive public 
demands timely action but cannot understand details or the implications of all bureaucratic-
institutional choices, elected officials are tempted to act too quickly so that they can demonstrate 
their responsiveness, even if their legislation is ill-considered. 
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  As an example, consider the response to the thalidomide episode about drug safety. 
Thalidomide was a drug given to pregnant women in the 1950s and early 60s to reduce the 
effects of morning sickness, but had disastrous side effects induced by impairing fetal 
development. Many so-called thalidomide babies were born without arms or legs.
109
  Prior to the thalidomide episode, Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) was highly critical of 
the drug regulatory process by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which had regulatory 
control over the introduction and oversight of drugs. For several years, he had held hearings and 
pushed legislation that would force drug manufacturers to prove their drugs were efficacious, 
namely, that they actually produced the effects that the manufacturers claimed. Of course, the 
problem of efficacy is largely independent of the problem of drug safety, which involves side 
effects.
110 In the wake of the thalidomide episode, the Congress quickly passed Kefauver’s 
proposals even the episode involved drug safety while the legislation largely addressed the 
problem of efficacy.  
This case exhibits two separate ironies. First, the 1962 Drug Amendments have been 
shown to have massive negative effects on the introduction of new drugs in the United States 
relative to Europe, Canada, and Japan. Second, under the existing regulatory scheme thalidomide 
had never been introduced in the United States (the side effects occurred from its distribution in 
Europe and Canada).
111
  Thus, the policy imperative created by a crisis combines with a public inattentive to 
policy details to push political officials to act quickly, sometimes more quickly than is advisable. 
For many officials, it is better to have some policy – any policy – than delay that eventually 
yields a policy better aimed at the problem. 
Second, another effect of crises concerns interest groups. In contrast to the pattern 
governing legislation and policymaking in ordinary times, crises can make it attractive for 
politicians to act despite the opposition of interest groups.  The policy equilibrium in ordinary 
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times generally reflects the influence of (sometimes competing) interest groups.  Crises that draw 
public attention provide a new source of political rewards to political officials. Public attention 
thus allows legislators and the president more room to bargain over policy changes given the 
extent of public demand.   
Nonetheless, it is wrong to assume that this window for policy innovation is more likely 
to lead to prescriptively attractive policies.  With interest groups less able to stop or water down 
a legislative change, the president and the legislature take center stage.  Presidents may seek new 
legislative authority to layer political appointees over existing independent agencies, while 
enterprising legislators lacking the most desirable committee assignments may scheme to 
enhance their own committees’ jurisdiction.  But, as will emerge below, their competing 
objectives are likely to lead them to create bureaucracies ill-equipped to achieve stated purposes, 
except under special conditions.  In contrast, politicians might work hard to build an effective 
bureaucracy after a crisis if the relevant goals are widely supported, if accurate information is 
widely available about the relationship between structural or legal changes and the advancement 
of those goals, and if bureaucratic performance to achieve those goals is easily observable over 
time.  If these conditions existed, a crisis could free politicians from some of the interest group 
pressures that often contribute to bureaucratic failure.  In contrast, in the absence of the 
aforementioned conditions, crises have the potential to introduce distinctive pathologies into the 
legislative process as legislators and the president scramble to produce changes simultaneously 
advancing their political agendas and pleasing a more attentive public. 
(2) The Role of Uncertainty.  The relationship between bureaucratic institutions and 
performance is not an exact science. This implies a significant degree of uncertainty about policy 
effects associated with any reorganization. More extensive reorganizations entail an even greater 
degree of uncertainty about long-term prescriptive consequences.  
  Consider a reorganization designed to create greater coordination among related 
agencies. Putting the agencies together under a single umbrella with greater centralization holds 
the potential for greater coordination. But it also has a range of potentially negative effects.  
First, by creating a far larger and more complex organization, massive centralization makes it 
harder for organizational leaders to master their organization, to understand its separate parts and 
to understand the complex ways in which better coordination can be achieved.  Even if a new 40 
agency were sharply focused on a narrow definition of homeland security, the full scope of 
activities involving matters such as immigration enforcement would require officials to 
understand sprawling intricacies.
112 Second, centralization can diminish the competition among 
agencies and risks creating a bureaucracy with a monopoly of control over a massive portion of 
the government’s operation.
113  Many areas of government feature competition because of the 
presence of multiple, semi-independent bureaucratic units, including the three branches of the 
military, the various agencies dealing with agriculture, and the many agencies focused on urban 
problems.   The absence of competition tends to imply less efficient performance.  Third, 
reorganization creates considerable uncertainty for individual bureaucrats by changing career 
patterns and promotion possibilities. Bureaucrats who lose power, authority, and promotion 
possibilities are far less likely to work toward the new goals sought by the reorganization. 
Rivalries within a single organization can often be counterproductive when one group seeks to 
promote itself over another.    Fourth, some scholars suggest that increasing the presence of 
levels of hierarchy slows down bureaucratic responses to legislative signals designed to control 
the agency’s work through the budget process.  Politicians trying to insulate policy from 
legislative control can therefore use layers of hierarchy to frustrate lawmakers’ control of agency 
actions.
114  Fifth, on a pragmatic level, reorganization and centralization may well decrease 
efficiency in the short run, as the transactions costs of combining computer systems and 
designing compatible operating procedures across formerly separate agencies takes considerable 
time and effort and in the short run may considerably impair performance.  
Taken together, these factors suggest that centralization is likely to have two separate 
effects heightening the difficulty of achieving prescriptive benefits from reorganization. On the 
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positive side, it holds the promise for greater coordination of effort, potentially allowing the 
efforts of many previously separate agencies to add up to a whole that is greater than the sum of 
its parts. On the negative side, centralization creates two different categories of problems. 
Uncertainty about its effects is a basic fact of organizational politics; and greater ability to 
coordinate in a centralized organization at the same time creates monopolization that reduces 
incentives for bureaucracies to efficiently carry out their supposed purposes.  These two 
opposing effects imply that the prescriptive question of how to structure bureaucracies to 
accomplish particular goals is a complex one, made all the more so because the full constellation 
of relevant interests rarely agree completely on what those goals should be. Reorganization could 
be complicated from a policy perspective, and they could have counter-intuitive effects.
115
  This is not to say that uncertainty associated with reorganization creates a complete veil 
of ignorance about the consequences of forging a massive new Department.  While key 
audiences trying to assess the long-term security payoffs of creating the Department would have 
faced considerable uncertainty, we do not believe that the probability of gains and losses is 
necessarily symmetrical.  Moreover, the evidence implies that reorganizations as complex and 
massive as the one from which DHS was forged would be beset by transition costs.
116  Finally, 
presidents and their staff members may be able to predict certain implications of reorganization, 
such as those impacting the performance of domestic regulatory mandates.
117  By pressing 
agencies to do more with similar or more constrained resource endowments, reorganizations can 
subtly force agencies to reshape their activities.  The relevance of uncertainty is in how difficult 
it made the process of precisely fixing the full extent of the costs and benefits associated with 
creating the Department.  Were those costs and benefits easier to observe, the political game 
affecting presidential and statutory choices would play out differently.
118   
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C.  Theoretical Conclusion: Policies Are Not Designed to Succeed 
  In combination, these principles imply that legislative allocations of bureaucratic 
authority over legal mandates are often, perhaps even typically, not designed to succeed at 
achieving their stated goals.  The need to pass legislation through a complex legislative process 
with many potential veto gates implies that a wide range of interests can hold up the legislation. 
Their price for allowing the legislation to move forward is that the legislation’s proponents alter 
the legislation in a way that advantages those holding veto power. In combination, these imply a 
wide range of factors that distort the goals of the legislation. Legislation rarely addresses policy 
problems directly. Indeed, sometimes they are designed to fail.  Moe’s conclusions about the 
design of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) during the early 1970s are 
instructive, and likely generalize to a host of agencies and legal mandates: 
While [the creation of OSHA] had the appearance of a systematic attack on the problem, 
in fact it was an administrative nightmare that did a thorough job of protecting business’s 
interests. Authority was divided among an independent board, the secretary of labor, the 
states, HEW [the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare], and the courts.  This 
would create confusion, lack of coordination, and multiple veto points.  No one was in 
charge, and the secretary of labor, in particular, was kept weak.
 119
As with the case of OSHA, the political dynamics discussed here show how the writing 
of legislation designed to pass creates pressures that often break the link between the goals of 
legislation and what the legislation actually does. The distributive tendency reflects 
congressional legislation tendency to benefit a wide variety of districts rather than concentrate 
resources where the problem lies. Multiple veto points allow a wide variety of legislators to hold 
legislation hostage in an effort to gain favorable adjustments. Indeed, the general need for 
legislative compromise means that almost all legislation is incoherent: the different legislative 
components often work at cross purposes whereby one section promotes a particular goal and 
another qualifies and limits the ability of an agency to attain that goal. All this can be 
exacerbated by a mismatch between congressional committee jurisdiction and the organization of 
a bureaucracy.  Put simply, the greater the dispersal of jurisdiction, the less coherent will be 
bureaucratic policymaking. Finally, partisan electoral goals often affect legislation.   
By placing the focus beyond position-taking and emphasizing the role of crises and the 
intricacies that impact the real-world effects of reorganization, our theoretical approach builds on 
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existing theories of how legislators allocate bureaucratic jurisdiction over legal mandates.  We 
posit not only that reorganizations are driven by politics, but that they can be used to further 
presidential control and policy objectives in specific ways – such as by reshaping the regulatory 
missions of bureaus, or redistributing authority from career officials and bureau heads to political 
appointees.  Our challenge is not just to the questionable assumption that reorganizations tend to 
achieve prescriptive objectives, but the theories that primarily emphasize position-taking or the 
role of politics generally without considering what policy or distributive goals are actually being 
achieved and through what structural techniques they are being achieved.  As the next Part 




III. Applying the Theory: The Architecture of the Department of Homeland Security 
 
  Our theory of the political-bureaucratic system provides a lens through which to interpret 
the legislative developments that forged the architecture of DHS.  In this Part, we use the theory 
to better understand the statutory and institutional features that have become characteristic of 
Department.  In the process, we revisit our two principal questions concerning the Department’s 
formation: why did the President change his mind to propose reorganization as a means of mega-
centralization?  Why did the President create a DHS that contains so many bureaucratic units, 
many of which are only tangentially related to homeland security? The answers to these 
questions turn out to be intimately related.  
A.  The Political Influence of Congress  
  Congressional influence permeated nearly every corner of the HSA legislation and the 
bureaucratic machinery it spawned. The Administration bill was short –  50 brief provisions in 
comparison with the congressional legislation including 200 ones – many of them in the 
convoluted legislative argot characteristically associated with lawmakers’ desire to control the 
bureaucracy.
120 The difference between the President’s proposal and the final congressional 
legislation reflects more than just filling in details and gaps; it reflects the effects of the 
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congressional politics engineering the new bureaucracy to serve the interests of its member; that 
is, to conform with the political-bureaucratic system.  
  Each of the principles discussed in the theoretical section applies to this case:  goal 
distortion and the distributive tendency, multiple veto points forcing alterations in the legislation, 
intra-congressional committee jurisdictional issues, electoral goals of the majority party against 
the minority party, uncertainty about the reorganization, and the role of the crisis. As the theory 
predicts, these principles add up to a set of policies that are not obviously designed to succeed at 
the stated objective of homeland security. 
Consider, for example, the impact of goal distortion as it plays out through the 
distributive tendency. Calculating the optimal allocation of funds is a complex task (as Powell 
suggests). This calculation must take into account a wide range of characteristics, including: (i) 
estimations of risk, themselves subject to uncertainty, such as the differential risks associated 
with targets in high profile cities, in places like New York and Washington; (ii) factors that 
reduce risk everywhere, such as increased boarder security; and (iii) the notion that making one 
target far more secure makes the next most vulnerable target more attractive to strategic 
terrorists.
121
  Despite the difficulty with creating an optimal spending plan, nearly everyone agrees that 
the allocation of funds should be based on the factors noted above, especially assessments of 
differential risk. Yet, as noted in the theory, spending money according to the optimal factors 
often implies high concentration of funds in particular districts, making these programs less 
popular in Congress. The congressional tendency is therefore to alter the criteria for spending in 
a way that spreads the money around, even at the expense of efficient pursuit of the legislation’s 
goals. This seems exactly what has happened. 
  DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff statements on January 4, 2006 provide evidence for this 
view. In response to sharp criticism, Chertoff made the astounding public announcement that 
thenceforth, the Department would base part of its homeland security grant allocation on risk 
factors (DHS could not allocate all the funds based on objective factors because the legislation 
required minimum percentage spending in every state). Chertoff announced new rules about the 
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distribution of such funds, based on the risk of terrorist attack to 35 urban areas deemed to be 
especially vulnerable to attack. Chertoff also stated that homeland security grants are “not party 
favors to be distributed as widely as possible,” thereby suggesting that the previous approach to 
distributing grants amounted to such “party favors.”
122 This admission acknowledged that the 
Department had not based its assessments on risk factors prior to this time.
123  
Indeed, a wide range of reports imply that some DHS spending may have degenerated 
into another source of congressional pork, especially though spending money in rural states with 
relatively low risks of terrorist attack.
124 While the port of New York and New Jersey is widely 
regarded as the highest risk, it received only $6.6 million in FY 2005, about equal to Memphis 
and far behind Houston’s $35.3 million.
125 The recent attempts to renew the Patriot Act in late 
2005 witnessed attempts in the House to place greater emphasis on risk factors and to lower the 
guaranteed minimum percentage going to each state from the prevailing .75 to .25 percent. The 
Senate, with its greater rural bias, beat back this plan so that the original law would prevail. This 
topic may well be revisited as the Congress reconsiders the Act’s renewal early this year.
126 
Similarly, an analysis of per capita homeland security grant spending for FY 2003 and FY 2004 
indicates that in both years Wyoming—the best-funded state—received $35.30 and $37.74 per 
capita, respectively. New York State, on the other hand, received only $5.10 and $5.41 per capita 
in each respective fiscal year. The small state-bias seems rooted in legislators’ distributive 
interests, filtered through institutions enhancing the political power of small states, rather than in 
meticulous analyses of why such funding should be allocated to Wyoming or similar states.
127
As the theory suggests, legislators’ distribution of federal funds reflects a common pool 
problem: while all are better off from a homeland security program that fulfills its objectives, 
each is better off if his or her district gains a bigger share of the total. When all members seek 
greater funds for their districts, however, the consequences can be enormous. Members of 
Congress have greatly hindered DHS’s ability to address the pressing problems of terrorism in 
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America by prescribing constraints on spending that have little or nothing to do with homeland 
security and all to do with their reelection prospects. 
Another policy realm where legislators’ reelection concerns seem to be paramount to 
security concerns is the creation of the so-called “Homeland Security Centers of Excellence.” 
The department created six such “HS-Centers,” located at the following universities: Johns 
Hopkins; the University of Southern California; Texas A&M; Minnesota; Maryland; and 
Michigan State. Each HS-Center has received a grant of between $10 million and $18 million 
over a three- or five-year period to study topics ranging from network analysis to the economic 
consequences of terrorist attacks.
128  We hypothesized that these centers would be created in the 
districts of legislators poised to lose committee jurisdiction as part of the transfer.  Table 2 
suggests this may have been the case: instead of creating a mechanism for choosing center 
locations on the basis of defensible analytic criteria, the statute essentially dictated the location 
of new centers – placing them in areas where at least one member of the congressional 
delegation stood to lose a measure of committee power.  Although such a loss of jurisdiction is 
almost never welcome among legislators, funding for the new homeland security centers may 
have served as part of the political exchange to increase support for the new legislation among 
members facing the prospect of diminished jurisdiction. 
 
Table 2:  Congressional Representation in HS-Center States and Districts
129
 




MD (7)  Rep. Elijah Cummings 
(D) 
Sen. Barbara A. 
Mikulski (D) 
Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes 
(D) 
Govt Reform (9 of 19 
D); Transportation (18 










CA (33)  Rep. Lucille Roybal-
Allard (D)  
Sen. Barbara Boxer (D) 
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TX (17)  Rep. Charles Stenholm 
(D) 
Sen. Phil Gramm (R) 














MN (5)  Rep. Martin Olav Sabo 
(D) 
Sen. Paul Wellstone 
(D) 
 
Sen. Mark Dayton (D) 
Appropriations (4 of 29 
D) 
Foreign Relations; 



















MI (8)  Rep. Mike Rogers (R) 
 
Sen. Carl Levin (D)  
 
Sen. Deborah Stabenow 
(D) 
Financial Services (36 
of 37 R); Transportation 
(28 of 42 R) 













A third example of political bias in the distribution of funds concerns the new structures 
for the transfers of funds. After 2001, Congress slightly reduced funding for natural disaster 
grants and dramatically increased funding for counterterrorism grants.
130 One example of an 
explosion in grant funding can be seen with grant opportunities provided through what was once 
the Department of Justice’s tiny Office of Domestic Preparedness. The office was transferred to 
DHS. Its grant-making abilities have grown exponentially since the transfer. In FY 1998, the 
Office of Domestic Preparedness awarded $12 million through a single grant program. As Table 
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3 indicates, by FY 2003, the office was in charge of meting out funds in seven separate 
programs, each ranging in total funding from $19 million to $1.5 billion.
131  Far from reluctant 
participants in this growth, legislative majorities voted to fund the grants well beyond what the 
President requested – adding over $800 million to the president’s request in this category for the 
FY 2004 budget.
132
Table 3:  Domestic Preparedness Grant Programs, 1998-2003
133
Fiscal Year  Name and Description of 
Program 
Total Funding Provided in 
Award Cycle 
1998  State and Local Domestic 
Preparedness Equipment Support 
Program 
$12 million 
1999  County and Municipal Agency 
Domestic Preparedness 
Equipment Support Program 





2000-2001  State Domestic Preparedness 
Equipment Program  
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 
Preparedness Equipment Program 







2002  State Domestic Preparedness 
Program 





2003  CERT Guidance (FEMA) 
UASI Port Security Grant 
Program 
UASI Transit Security Grant 
Program 
UASI Grant Program I 
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  While the funding of preparedness and research has proven to be an important aspect of 
the new Department’s activity, legislative process did more than simply inject distributive 
concerns into the architecture of DHS.  It also diluted the extent to which lawmakers considered 
the prescriptive merits of reorganization, or reorganized the internal distribution of legislative 
committee jurisdiction to realize those benefits.  
The overt rationale for creating the massive agency was coordination.  Yet the 
prescriptive benefits of reorganization are highly uncertain. Centralization creates a far more 
massive organization, implying that organizational leaders have much greater difficulty 
mastering the various pieces. Department leaders’ difficulties in managing FEMA and its natural 
disaster mission have made this plain.
134  Centralization may also contribute to greater 
monopolization of functions within the government, yielding less competition among bureaus 
and dissipating the potential benefits of competition. Reorganization creates considerable 
uncertainty about future career paths for bureaucrats. Those whose futures have been 
downgraded or who face the most uncertainty are most likely to work less hard or leave the 
agency. This too has become evident in FEMA, as many of its former employees simply left.
135  
Finally, substantial short-run costs arise from centralization as agencies undergo the transactions 
costs of integrating personal, information, financial, management, and field systems.  These raise 
serious questions – almost entirely neglected in the legislative process – about whether 
centralization on the scale of DHS has had a net increase in the effective provision of homeland 
security.
136
                                                           
134 See SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATION THE PREPARATION FOR AND PRESPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 3 (2006)(“DHS was not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of 
Hurricane Katrina,” and “DHS had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with [its] rules and responsibilities under the 
National Response Plan and National Incident Management System”).  See also infra Part III.e. 
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Changes, Protection From Natural Hazards May be Trumped by “Homeland Security,” BALTIMORE CITY PAPER, 
Sept. 29 2004 at 9 (“Within FEMA, the shift away from mitigation programs is so pronounced that many longtime 
specialists in the field have quit.  In fact, disaster professionals are leaving many parts of FEMA in droves…”). 
136 See generally Lewis, supra note 7, at __.  Regarding the application of this insight to intelligence issues, see 
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A second prescriptive problem legislators neglected involved the mismatch of 
congressional jurisdictions and bureaucratic centralization. Although the reorganization made 
massive changes in bureaucratic organization, Congress declined to engineer the parallel changes 
in congressional oversight. The House Judiciary committee is particularly illustrative. Among 
the Judiciary Committee’s many amendments, the committee voted to transfer only the law 
enforcement functions of INS to DHS, keeping the citizenship functions at the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and, obviously, under the purview of the committee. Besides retaining their 
oversight functions, the Judiciary Committee also voted to increase their responsibility by 
approving an amendment to transfer the Secret Service and the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center from Treasury to the DOJ.
137 The House leadership did create a special nine-
member Select Committee on Homeland Security in July 2002 to screen the changes made by 
individual committees,
138 but House Speaker Hastert largely populated this panel with committee 
chairs who could protect their jurisdiction.
139  Legislators also showed significant resistance at 
the time the HSA was passed. President Bush reportedly made some early attempts to encourage 
Congress to solve the jurisdictional issue,
140 but legislators essentially ignored him.  
The massive bureaucratic reorganization unaccompanied by any congressional 
reorganization implies that the structure of bureaucratic incentives induced by congressional 
oversight work against the effects of centralization. This problem raises another variant of the 
congressional common pool problem: though all members may have wanted to achieve 
significant homeland security improvement, they also sought to control a piece of the 
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S.F. CHRON (July 12, 2004),  accessed January 1, 2006. 
140 Lydia Adetunji, Bush Warns of Homeland Security Turf Battles Ahead, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2002,  accessed 
December 12, 2005.  51 
bureaucracy.  Doing so, legislators could claim credit for steering policy in a highly-salient 
domain,
141 and for steering funds in directions benefiting constituents.  Many members of the 
relevant subcommittees have specialized in helping existing constituents of the agencies being 
moved to DHS. To the extent that coordination lowers the level of service legislators could 
provide to their constituents, these members are likely to use their oversight jurisdiction to 
impede coordination.
142
  Because the creation of the DHS made massive changes to the bureaucracy while leaving 
the existing structure of congressional jurisdictions in place, congressional incentives cut against 
the goals of centralization and coordination.
143  The piecemeal set of congressional jurisdictions 
reflected the old set of priorities; in particular, a set of agencies that did not coordinate. Much of 
the lack of coordination under the old system represents a set of diverse agencies serving diverse 
constituencies overseen by a diverse set of subcommittees. Leaving the old congressional 
jurisdictions intact allows representatives of the old, uncoordinated system to pull their agencies 
away from the coordination-related goals of the new system and to continue to serve their old 
constituents’ interests. In addition, leaving the existing distribution of committee jurisdiction 
yields another problem interfering with the potential benefits of centralization: the new agency’s 
leaders must report to all of the separate congressional committees, depleting the time they can 
devote to coordinating the Department. In a less sprawling reorganization, such reporting 
demands may prove less problematic. Not so with DHS; by 2004, department officials were 
called to testify – on average – about twenty times a month.
144
Yet most of these prescriptive concerns – whether about the merits of centralization, or 
about the need to overhaul congressional committee jurisdiction in order to capture the benefits 
of centralization – were cast aside.  Instead, senior legislators from both parties maneuvered to 
preserve their committees’ power.  And the parties themselves competed in trying to take credit 
for an impending reorganization with growing public salience.  In the process, Republicans 
appear to have baited the Democrats on several issues, notably the drug liability and civil service 
exemptions. In the debate just prior to the 2002 elections, several visible Democrats opposed 
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these provisions. The strategy seemed to work: those Democrats who opposed these provisions 
were painted as being against homeland security, and several key members, most notably 
Senator Max Cleland, lost their reelection bids.
145 In the weeks before the November 5, 2002 
midterm Congressional election, polling results reveal that the public viewed the President and 
the Republican Party as better at handling national security-related issues. In a poll of registered 
voters, a July 2002 CBS News/New York Times poll found that 49% of respondents thought that 
the Republican party would be “more likely to make the right decisions when it comes to dealing 
with terrorism,” as compared to only 22% who believed the Democratic party would do so.
146 
These results suggest that voters responded to a successful effort by the President and the 
Republicans to project a favorable image of their handling of homeland security immediately 
prior to the midterm election.  
B.  The Political Influence of the President  
  Along with Congress, the President exerted considerable influence over the creation of 
DHS, with the massive scope the reorganization plan a case in point.  But given the extent of the 
                                                           
145 Regarding the strategy, see Clarke, supra note 26, at 250 (“Those who opposed the legislation, the 
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2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 
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legislature’s influence, the White House’s role in the reorganization raises the question of 
whether the President was merely responding to external pressure. 
  Consistent with such a conjecture, some observers place considerable explanatory weight 
on the existence of what might be termed a “bandwagon” effect, where the President’s hand was 
forced by growing legislative interest in creating the new Department. To the extent that some 
form of reorganization was likely to pass, the argument presumes, the President’s public image 
was best served by being in favor of DHS rather than by opposing it and losing.
147  Moreover, 
perhaps the president also had an incentive to differentiate his plan from others so as to be able to 
claim credit for the reorganization.
148  
Although the bandwagon effect undoubtedly came into play – and may even explain the 
president’s initial willingness to revisit the creation of the Department – it cannot explain the 
details of the White House proposal, such as why the President’s alternative plan was so 
massive.  The President could have gotten on the bandwagon with a reorganization only 
modestly different from those already being Congress, and would have almost certainly 
heightened the possibility of its adoption by proposing a smaller reorganization devoid of 
features such as assistant secretary positions not subject to Senate confirmation that were 
designed to heighten presidential influence.
149  Viewed from this perspective, a reorganization of 
comparatively larger scope and size may have posed a heightened risk to the President’s image 
as an effective leader.  
  To explain why the reorganization included so many different bureaucracies, we raise 
another piece of the puzzle. Why did Bush, so fiscally profligate in general, insist that the DHS 
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be “revenue neutral?”  The stated rationale for the large DHS umbrella was that centralization 
and coordination would improve homeland security. Yet this rationale alone cannot explain why 
centralization went so far to include so many agencies (and parts of agencies) whose missions 
are so tangential to homeland security. As we have seen, the uncertainty about the effects of 
reorganization combined with the lack of congressional jurisdictional reorganization to question 
whether centralization would yield net benefits for homeland security. Reflecting Bush’s initial 
misgivings about reorganization, the administration understood these problems in advance, and 
these weighed against centralization. 
Our thesis is that a major reason why DHS encompassed a massive reorganization is that 
it furthers Bush’s domestic policy interests that are largely independent of homeland security. 
Indeed a major consequence of the new DHS structure – perhaps the most important 
consequence – concerns domestic policy, not homeland security. Legislators understood that the 
creation of the new department would inevitably have consequences for domestic policy.  First, 
legislators were clearly concerned about what the new department would mean for the important 
non-security duties for which the agencies in question were charged.  Much of the early debate in 
Congress about the president’s proposal focused on whether, for example, it was wise to transfer 
FEMA and the Coast Guard to DHS given their domestic policy mandates. As noted above, the 
legislation addressed this directly.
150
The HSA demonstrates the extent to which political actors recognized the domestic 
regulatory policy stakes of the creation of the Department.
151  The committee report 
accompanying legislation concludes: 
[M]any agencies within the Department… perform important non-homeland security 
missions that Americans rely on every day.  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service protects ecosystems from invasive species.  The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency assists local communities to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.  The 
U.S. Coast Guard performs essential maritime search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, 
marine safety, marine environmental protection, navigation assistance, and migrant 
interdiction functions.  The Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services provides asylum for refugees and assists immigrants in 
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becoming American citizens.  The Customs Service protects and monitors foreign trade 
that is essential for a healthy American economy.  The Secret Service monitors and 
protects against identity theft, counterfeiting, and other financial crimes.
152
Nonetheless, the provisions in the bill also demonstrate how, despite these concerns, the explicit 
terms of legislative compromise creating DHS allow for a diminution in domestic regulatory 
activities.  Put simply, the DHS provides a statutory and organizational framework that allows 
Bush officials to divert a wide range of resources from agency legacy mandates to homeland 
security activities. Regardless of whether these activities, tangential to homeland security, have 
any impact on security, the administration has reason to value the diversion of resources out of 
the legacy mandates it finds worthy of disapproval.   
  The potential to reshaping legal implementation through reorganization can be further 
grasped by contrasting it to strategies deployed by the Reagan Administration.  A major policy 
goal of President Ronald Reagan was to reduce what many Republicans believed as a bloated 
federal government. This included a wide range of governmental programs that they did not 
value or believed outright harmful to the economy. Reagan was ideologically against an 
elaborate regulatory state that he disparagingly termed “big government.”  When he took office, 
he appointed a range of administrative heads who shared his views. Many sought to sabotage 
their agency’s efforts, in part by simply stopping the agency’s efforts to enforce the law.
153
  This strategy failed. Constituencies benefiting from the agency’s regulation took the 
agencies to court in an attempt to get them to enforce the existing set of laws administered by the 
relevant agencies. The courts agreed and, absent agency proceedings that decided on a different 
enforcement strategy, forced them to continue administering the law as they had. Ann Gorsuch’s 
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leadership of the EPA illustrates this failure. Her attempts to slash the agency’s budget and 
failure to uphold environmental laws led to her resignation.
154
  Bush’s goals were not the same as Reagan’s, and he did not appear to share the full extent 
of Reagan’s ideological commitment to the market.
155 Like Reagan, however, Bush believed a 
wide range of domestic programs should be outside the purview of the national government. The 
Reagan administration’s experience nonetheless demonstrated that the strategy of direct 
sabotage, shirking, and neglect of the law was unlikely to work. 
But, as we have seen, crises have a capacity to change the political equation.  One such 
change – which may have initially seemed unrelated to the Administration’s regulatory and 
administrative agenda – involved the President’s homeland security agenda.  Even after the 
September 11 attacks, the President was reluctant to create a new homeland security cabinet 
agency.  Despite the uncertain long-term benefits of centralizing homeland security and the high 
transition costs, Congress nonetheless accepted the reorganization because of their conventional 
common pool problems.  In the President's case, his revealed preference of no reorganization 
eventually dissipated in the face of gathering congressional and public support for 
reorganization.   
Once the White House recognized that avoiding reorganization altogether was not an 
option, the Administration’s strategy became decidedly more ambitious.  Perhaps the September 
11 attacks would provide the Bush Administration with a unique opportunity to reduce a range of 
domestic policies of which he disapproved.  The Coast Guard’s extensive regulatory functions – 
including the protection of marine ecosystems, the regulation of marine safety, and setting 
requirements for the use of port facilities – were long unpopular with a number of business 
constituencies that have often been supportive of Republicans in recent years, including cargo 
vessel operators,
156 the fishing industry,
157 tanker and oil companies,
158 and cruise lines.
159  
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Republicans also questioned certain FEMA functions that could be framed as essentially social 
welfare policies, including its role in food and shelter assistance, non-competitive mitigation 
grants, and subsidized flood insurance.
160  As historian Douglas Brinkley has written, even just a 
few years after FEMA’s creation, “the incoming Reagan administration saw the outfit as a feel-
good liberal money drain, a cousin to HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] 
and HEW.”
161
The new strategy sought to bring a wide range of agencies with domestic programs 
within the umbrella of the DHS.  Three separate components of the DHS umbrella furthered 
Bush’s domestic policy goals: one legislative, one organizational, and one budgetary. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Administration efforts to  use Coast Guard regulatory and revenue authority for harbor deepening and environmental  
enforcement).  The report describes congressional Republican concern with proposed Coast Guard activities thus: 
 
Already, House Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Subcommittee Chairman Wayne Gilchrest, R. 
Md., has said the administratin’s intent to tax cargo-vessel operators almost $1 billion to fund coastal, Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway harbor deepening and maintenance dredging is “dead-on-arrival.”  Also 
under attack is a proposed vessel fee to fund Coast Guard navigation and other safety assistance activities. 
157 See Rebecca Boren, Coast Guard Report is Making Waves for Miller, SEATTLE POST –INTELLIGENCER A10, April 
12, 1991, avail. at 1991 WLNR 1381678.  Describing the consequences of a Washington State Republican 
Congressman’s efforts to delay enforcement of Coast Guard safety rules on a fisheries corporation, the article notes 
that: 
 
The sinking of a fish-processing trawler in calm waters off Alaska a year ago is creating a stormy sea for 
Congressman John Miller’s pursuit of a U.S. Senate seat in 1992.  The families of some of the nine 
crewmen who died last March when the Aleutian Enterprise sank recently have accused the Seattle 
Republican of causing those deaths by interfering in the Coast Guard’s efforts to enforce marine safety 
rules on factory trawlers.   
158 See Les Blumenthal, Oil Tanker Restrictions in Sound Will Remain, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (TACOMA, WASH.) 
B01, Oct. 7, 2005, avail. at 2005 WLNR 16387520(“A provision that would have lifted the 28-year-old [Coast 
Guard] restrictions on oil tanker traffic in Puget Sound will be dropped from a new energy bill, Washington sate 
lawmakers said Thursday.  The decision by Republican sponsors of the bill came after a lobbying effort by three of 
the state’s House members”)(emphasis added). 
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indicated that the industry appeared to generate $605 million in wages in Florida alone, and that the Republican 
Party took “the largest amount” of contributions from cruise lines.  In the story Florida Republican House member 
Tom Feeney also stated that “The cruise industry probably learned that when they weren’t super active in the 
political process… someone almost took their head off.  I think they’ve decided to be active.” 
160 See, e.g., Bill Walsh, House Panel Strips Millions From FEMA Budget; Vitter Supports Cuts to Disaster Relief, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 20, 2001, avail. at 2001 WLNR 1066723 (“Despite warnings that it could 
slow emergency response to future flood and hurricane victims, house Republicans have stripped $389 million in 
disaster relief money from the budget as part of an effort to keep federal spending in check.”); Julie Mason and 
Karen Masterson, Houston Delegates at Odds: FEMA Fight Latest Flare Up in the House, HOUSTON CHRON. A1, 
Aug. 5, 2001 (“Bentsen went around [House Majority Whip Tom] DeLay and took a tough public stance against a 
GOP plan to slash FEMA’s disaster assistance.”). 
161 Brinkley, supra note 10, at 247. 58 
legislative component gave all the agencies moved to DHS new statutory responsibility that 
differed from their legacy mandates. Specifically, agencies brought within the umbrella had a 
new law requiring them to act. In contrast to the agencies in the Reagan era, the agencies moved 
to DHS now faced a set of statutes with conflicting goals – their legacy mandates versus the new 
homeland security mandate.  Indeed, even before the creation of DHS formalized the importance 
of the Coast Guard’s new security priorities, the media began reporting how the agency had been 
forced to reorient its resources: “While only 1 percent of [the Coast Guard’s resources were 
dedicated to port security before September 11, more than 50 percent of all coast guardsmen are 
now [in mid-2002] focused on homeland security.”
162  As one longtime Coast Guard observer 
noted at the time, “there wasn’t a whole lot of capacity for [the Coast Guard] essentially to pick 
up this new mission without it impacting significantly on its traditional mission.”
163
  Second, Bush’s insistence that DHS be budget-neutral implied that all resources devoted 
by these agencies to homeland security diverted resources from the agencies’ legacy mandates. 
Budget neutrality forced these agencies to devote fewer resources to their legacy mandates. The 
more these agencies spent on homeland security, the less they spent on their legacy mandates. 
  Third, placing these agencies within the DHS organizational framework served to further 
this diversion of resources. Were the agency left independent or in its former department, the 
agency (possibly in collaboration with its former department) would make the determination of 
the tradeoff of how much resources to transfer from its legacy mandate to homeland security 
concerns. It could, for example, decide that three percent of its resources is appropriate. Placing 
these agencies within DHS, however, empowered Bush administration officials to help make that 
tradeoff. In particular, placing these agencies within DHS allowed departmental leaders leverage 
with which to force agencies to make a greater tradeoff than they would otherwise; that is, to 
devote greater resources to homeland security than the agency would do on its own.  
  In short, the creation of DHS appears to have allowed Bush to transfer resources out of 
agency legacy mandates into new homeland security concerns. Because Bush did not value these 
legacy mandates, this statutory/ bureaucratic approach made him better off even if the resources 
diverted from legacy mandates to homeland security activities produce no tangible homeland 
security benefits.  
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Legislators, too, recognized early that DHS was, to some extent, a presidential power-
grab and, as such, made efforts to rein in what they saw as an overextension of executive power. 
These attempts can be clearly demonstrated through a comparison of the president’s initial bill 
proposal and the resulting HSA. Examples of how legislators refused to give the president the 
full authority he desired are repeatedly apparent. The final bill, for instance, did not give the 
White House the authority to appoint assistant secretaries without Senate confirmation, as was 
requested in the original proposal. Nor, as previously mentioned, was the president granted the 
right to control when agencies were transferred (Section 802 in the proposal) or the allocation of 
funds from the transferred agencies to the Secretary of DHS (Section 803 (c) in the proposal). 
Finally, Congress voted to include the establishment of the National Homeland Security Council 
within the Executive Office—an agency that was not proposed in the president’s plan.    
In addition to the legislation’s language, floor statements reveal legislators’ weariness of 
conferring more power on the president. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) said of the HSA in a floor 
statement to the Senate: “The President is clearly attempting to remove the limits on his power. I 
don't question his good intention. Maybe he doesn't understand what he is doing. But this is 
clearly an attempt to remove limits on the Executive's power…”
164 This comment is 
representative of the deep distrust Congress felt over what they perceived as a presidential grab 
for increased authority. 
Legislators’ efforts to control presidential power indicate the extent to which the 
President viewed the fight over DHS not only as one over the appropriate degree of 
centralization that should govern homeland security policy, but over the extent of direct 
presidential control over the regulatory, bureaucratic, and legal functions that would be vested in 
the new department.  Although legislative responses limited how much power the President 
achieved through the HSA, its creation significantly enhanced the power of the executive. The 
new law allowed the President to select a cadre of political appointees to oversee twenty-two 
agencies lodged in a new bureaucracy with the daunting mission of protecting the homeland 
while continuing to carry out non-homeland security missions.  After a tense fight in Congress, 
the Department civil service employees were also subject to more flexible personnel rules, 
thereby allowing political appointees to control them more readily.   
                                                           
164 Congressional Record, September 3, 2002 (Senate), pg. S0846. 60 
  The umbrella structure had another, organizational effect that served the same purpose of 
increasing executive power. By virtue of being placed within DHS, the DHS hierarchy could 
make it clear to the bureaucrats specializing in the legacy mandates that they were no longer the 
agency’s priority, and therefore were less likely to be promoted into the agency’s senior 
management. All this meant that these bureaucrats would be treated less well, and would be 
more likely to leave.
165  At the very least, the DHS umbrella gave Bush officials and agency 
leaders opposed to the agency’s legacy mandate additional tools with which to sabotage the 
agency’s ability to perform their legacy legal mandates.
166
As a result, the creation of DHS appears to represent a clever domestic political 
innovation, allowing Bush to attain goals in ways that Reagan failed. Reagan’s direct attempt to 
circumvent or ignore domestic regulatory laws largely ended in disaster.
167 By giving the Bush 
administration new statutory and organizational tools, the DHS umbrella provided the legal 
means to divert considerable resources away from domestic legacy mandates. 
                                                           
165 See, e.g., R.G. Edmonson, DHS Moving Ahead After Port Worker ID Delays, J. COMMERCE (May 17, 2006), 
avail. at 2006 WLNR 8536041 (“[E]mployee turnover at all levels in Homeland Security was a factor in delaying 
the program”); Angela Greiling Keane, Brain Drain Pains DHS, TRAFFIC WORLD 13 (April 3, 2006) avail. at 2006 
WLNR 5395365 (“More turnover rattled the Department of Homeland Security…”); Spencer S. Hsu, Weaknesses in 
Nation’s Emergency Preparedness Exposed Yet Again by Katrina, WASHINGTON POST WP-Bus (Oct. 15, 2005) 
avail. at 2005 WLNR 16732955 (“Personnel turnover, constantly changing priorities and splict responsibilities 
among federal agencies… sap the nation’s ability…”); Homeland Security Struggles with ‘Extraordinary’ Turnover, 
EXTREMETECH.COM (June 10, 2005) avail. at 2005 WLNR 9519206; Chris Cillizza, Bills Scold Executive Branch, 
ROLL CALL (May 25, 2005) avail. at 2005 WLNR 8280726 (“Homeland Security has had two secretaries and three 
deputy secretaries in its brief existence.  More than 40 percent of high-level staff positions are currently vacant.”). 
166 Our analysis of the potential policy payoffs to the White House from expansive reorganization raises two 
additional questions.  First, if the Administration’s inclusion of regulatory agencies within DHS was partly 
motivated by a desire to control and curtail administrative and regulatory activity, why did some Democratic 
proposals also include large regulatory agencies such as the Coast Guard?  Although Lieberman’s proposal was 
nearly as large in scope as Bush’s, the context and substance of their proposals differed in important ways.   
Lieberman was likely motivated by the prospect of grabbing power for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 
in which he played a leading role.  Moreover, as Part I notes, Bush’s proposal was not only larger in the end, but its 
development nearly resulted in the inclusion of even more regulatory agencies that were not included in Democratic 
proposals – such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration.  In addition, 
Bush’s proposal included elements expanding presidential power by weakening of civil service and provisions to 
appoint Assistant Secretaries without Senate confirmation. Finally, as we note below, Bush’s proposal was coupled 
with moves to impose budgetary restrictions on agencies so as to force agencies to substitute homeland security 
efforts for their legacy mandates.  The second question is why the Department was not even larger.   As with past 
reorganization efforts, the White House was likely to best achieving its goals by balancing the costs and benefits of 
marginal increases in the scope and size of the department.  (1) Legislative resistance from affected committees 
would be greater as more functions were placed in the department; (2) the hidden domestic policy implications of 
the reorganization might become starkly apparent to the public; and (3) there might be a genuine risk that even more 
massive reorganizations would adversely impact critical functions such as air traffic control (which was considered 
and ultimately rejected as a candidate for inclusion).   
167 See supra notes 154-156 (discussing the limits of President Reagan’s capacity to dilute regulatory enforcement). 61 
C.  The Role of the Post-9/11 Crisis 
The crisis following the September 11 attacks had several predictable effects on the 
policymaking process concerning homeland security. First, it gave the president an issue from 
which he could launch a new phase of his theretofore lackluster presidency and his rapidly 
declining public approval rating. The weekend before the 9/11 attacks, President Bush received a 
job approval rating of 51%; by September 21, 2001, his job approval rating had skyrocketed to a 
record-breaking 90%.
168 But this popularity was relatively short-lived as Bush’s approval rating 
steadily dropped over the next eight months to a post-9/11 low of 70% immediately before the 
DHS announcement. Because of the sharp decline in presidential popularity, the White House 
must have felt pressure to produce additional terrorism-related policy; the USA Patriot Act, 
creation of the TSA, the invasion of Afghanistan and a spate of other executive actions were not 
enough. 
Bush therefore sought to take visible command of the policymaking process and 
shepherded the various legislation through the process, legislation that had clearly become his 
and not that of the Congress. To do so, he had to provide a plan that differentiated his 
administration’s proposal from those under discussion in Congress.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of a crisis is that the attentive public demanded quick 
action. Especially in a national security crisis where the public feels vulnerable, quick action is 
needed to assure citizens that their risk has been significantly lowered. Perhaps most 
significantly, the public cares deeply about terrorism and homeland security issues. Even before 
9/11, Gallup reported that a significant proportion of Americans were concerned about being 
victims of a terrorist attack. In a poll in April 2000, Gallup found that 24% of respondents were 
either very or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would be a victim of an 
Oklahoma City-style bombing.
169 In January of 2001, Gallup found that 47% of respondents 
reported that it was somewhat or very likely that terrorists or another country using nuclear 
weapons within the next ten years would attack the U.S.
170  
                                                           
168 Frank Newport, The American Public Reacts, THE GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, (September 24, 2001), avail. at 
www.gallup.org. Last accessed January 14, 2006. 
169 Terrorist Attacks: Public Opinion from April 1995-January 2001, THE GALLUP POLL NEW SERVICE, (September 
11, 2001), avail. at www.gallup.org. Last accessed January14, 2006.  
170 Id. 62 
The public’s concern increased over time,
171 and coincided with broad public support for 
reorganization.  Although only limited public opinion data are available regarding the creation of 
DHS, available data suggests that Americans generally supported idea of a cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Security even before the President’s announcement.
172 Additionally, a 
January 31, 2002 poll found that 84% of respondents approved of Bush’s request to spend $38 
billion on homeland security.
173 After President Bush made the June 7, 2002 announcement in 
which he endorsed the creation of DHS, public opinion reflected a belief that DHS was a good 
idea. In a typical poll, Gallup found that 72% of respondents approved of the creation of DHS.
174 
The widespread popularity of reorganization suggests the potential position-taking benefit that 
politicians could achieve by supporting the creation of DHS.  
As legislators and the President pursued the creation of the massive department, the 
public’s inability to assess the intricacies of the plan had three separate effects on crisis 
policymaking.  First, citizens demand for action induced political officials to prefer quick action 
that is less well-considered and well-designed to slower action that is better considered and 
better-designed. Second, the need to pass something quickly also allowed political officials to 
hide other initiatives with very different aims within the plans to address the crisis. Third, the 
demanding public, unable to analyze the implications of transition costs or organizational details, 
put legislators seeking better plans (or who oppose the plans) at a political disadvantage. 
Opposition most ostensibly delays action, and if the public cannot appreciate the policy-
specificity of the argument, those seeking to improve the process appear simply as opponents. 
Again, this clearly occurred in the case of Max Cleland.
175 All three effects appeared to have an 
impact on homeland security policymaking.  
                                                           
171 In the weeks following the attacks, as might be expected, the number of respondents concerned about terrorism 
increased, with 48% of respondents reporting that they were somewhat or very worried that they or someone in their 
family would be a victim of a terrorist attack. Gallup Poll, September 20-21, 2001. www.gallup.com. Last accessed 
January 14, 2006. 
172 In a Time/CNN/Harris poll in late September 2001, 56% of respondents believed that the Office of Homeland 
Security would make the country safer.  Survey by Time, Cable News Network and Harris Interactive, September 
27, 2001. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut. www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html 
173 Survey by The Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2002. Retrieved January 14, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, 
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html 
174 Frank Newport, Americans Approve of Proposed Department of Homeland Security, THE GALLUP POLL NEWS 
SERVICE (June 10, 2002) avail. at www.gallup.org. Last accessed January 14, 2006 
175 This aspect of the DHS suggests the impact of voters’ knowledge and sophistication, and not just the salience of 
the underlying issue, on the allocation of legal responsibilities across bureaucracies.  Cf.  Richard R. Lau and David 
P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. 63 
D.  Budget Politics and Legacy Mandates 
  Evidence from the budgets of transferred agencies is consistent with the hypothesis that 
reorganization was a means of furthering domestic legal and policy goals. First, in his initial 
proposal to create the department, Bush repeatedly promised that DHS would be “revenue-
neutral,” meaning that the new department would not cost any more than the combined budgets 
of its component parts.
176  Table 4 indicates that the Bush Administration’s projected budgets for 
the Department of Homeland Security in FY 2003 and 2004 held resources constant compared to 
the 2002 figures (once we include both actual and supplemental expenditures).  We argue that 
this push for budget-neutrality implies that the Administration had ulterior motives for the 
creation of DHS; namely, that by giving new homeland security mandates to the agencies within 
DHS and by not giving the agencies any new funding to perform these mandates, the president 
forced resources out of legacy regulatory functions of the agencies transferred to DHS.   
 
Table 4: Bush Administration Projections of Discretionary Budget Authority for the 
Department of Homeland Security, FY 2002-2004 (in millions)
177
 
  2002 (actual & 
supplemental) 
2003 2004   
Discretionary Budget 
Authority  
31,051 27,884 29,185 
 
In succeeding years, Departmental spending exceeded the Bush Administration’s initial 
projections.
178  But once we remove supplemental appropriations such as those funding the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
SCI. 951 (2001)(the use of cognitive short-cuts, or heuristics increase the probability of a correct vote by political 
experts but decrease the probability of a correct vote by novices).  But see Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, 
The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence: How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know, in ELEMENTS 
OF REASON: CONGITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 47 (Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and 
Samuel Popkin, eds. 2000)(low-information rationality and political competence are possible through heuristics and 
institutions allowing citizens to interpret complex information).  These is little doubt that voters with limited 
knowledge can often make reasonable choices by analyzing the behavior of organized interests (and by drawing on 
perceptions about the relationship of their own views to those of the relevant organized interests).  But voters’ 
relative ignorance about the intricacies of legislative proposals may be especially likely to affect political 
circumstances during crises, where policy changes may happen more rapidly, and in circumstances where prominent 
organized interests (such as the NRA or the ACLU) do not take an explicit position.  Both of those conditions were 
present when the HSA was under consideration. 
176 See Take Time on Homeland Plan, HARTFORD COURANT A8 (June 20, 2002)(“Mr. Bush says his proposal will be 
revenue-neutral…”); Looking for Fiscal Patriots, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL 10 (June 17, 2002) avail. at 2002 
WLNR 3684322 (“Mr. Bush’s proposed Department of Homeland Security would be revenue neutral, the 
president’s aides insist…”). 
177 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 161 (2003). 
178 See Budget of the United States 2007, Historical Tables (2006). 64 
aftermath of disasters such as Katrina, a different picture emerges.  As Figure 1 indicates, overall 
discretionary funding for DHS remained relatively constant between 2003 and 2006, and the 
President’s request for 2007 continues the pattern.
179  The key comparison in the figure is 
between total DHS funding (excluding supplementals) and DHS homeland security spending. 
Because the latter rises faster than the former, it shows that DHS spending on legacy mandates 
decreased. 
Although the budget for DHS and its components appears to have increased substantially, 
much of the increase occurred through a supplemental appropriation before the new Department 
had been created and reflected, in large measure, disaster related expenditures associated with 
the September 11 attacks, new grant programs, and the creation of the TSA.
180
Figure 1 
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An even more telling picture emerges from the breakdown of appropriations flowing to 
DHS on the basis of whether the Office of Management and Budget considers an appropriation 
                                                           
179 See id. 
180  See  Budget of the United States 2004: Department of Homeland Security (2003)(showing the size of 
supplemental appropriations as a proportion of total resources provided for DHS bureaus in 2002). 65 
to be primarily homeland security-related or non-homeland security-related.
181  Total DHS 
discretionary funds flowing to DHS have remained essentially flat, but the dedicated homeland 
security resources within the department have consistently risen.  As Figure 2 shows, the 
proportion of resources flowing to functions most directly related to homeland security has 
increased from about 65% to roughly 90% during the life of the Department.  Admittedly, the 
appropriations designated as primarily homeland security-related almost certainly have the 
potential to provide a measure of non-security benefits.
182  It is revealing, however, that the 
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  We can learn still more about budgetary developments by going beyond broad funding 
categories and examining patterns involving individual bureaus.  As Table 5 indicates, some 
                                                           
181  See  Budget of the United States 2004, Analytical Perspectives (2003); Budget of the United States 2005, 
Analytical Perspectives (2004); Budget of the United States 2006, Analytical Perspectives (2005); and Budget of the 
United States 2007, Analytical Perspectives (2006). 
182 As best we can tell, OMB’s definition of “homeland security” focuses on the protection of the American national 
territory, and its population and infrastructure, from manmade threats.  See supra Part I for examples of other 
sources that have defined the term in a similar fashion. 
183 Even if the resources of departments and bureaus were growing overall, changes in the proportion of resources 
dedicated to a particular mission alter internal and external perceptions of a bureau’s mission, the allocation of time 
and attention of its leadership, and its relationships to external constituencies.  Cf. LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, 
REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR FREIGHT POLICY AT THE ICC (1994)(describing how the 
organization’s priorities, internal culture, and relationships with external interests shifted as the proportion of 
economic activity it regulated increasingly involved trucking instead of rail transportation). 66 
agencies that clearly encompass both traditional homeland security functions as well as domestic 
regulatory activities did experience budget increases.   
 
Table 5: Budget Authority of Selected DHS Sub-Agencies, FY2000-2004
184
 
  FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 
APHIS 
(millions) 
634  880 1145 813 
Coast Guard 
(billions) 
3.3 3.8 4.9 4.7 
FEMA 
(billions) 
2.4 3.1 6.6 4.7 
 
But here too, a different picture emerges from the details.  Consider first the Coast Guard.  
Some of the budget increases for the Coast Guard cover long-anticipated infrastructure needs, 
and only to a partial degree.
185  Despite the flow of some additional resources to the bureau, 
some legislators maintain that the agency not received adequate resources to carry out its new 
mandates.  In a debate during the Coast Guard reauthorization process, Representative Howard 
Coble commented “that the Coast Guard leaders ‘must have a magic wand’ because he said they 
have seamlessly assumed a range of new responsibilities without corresponding increases in 
funding.”
186  Moreover, individual appropriations account for the Coast Guard tell a story of 
shifting priorities.   Several major programs of the Coast Guard experienced a sharp decline 
around 2003; most notably, these programs include Marine Environmental Protection and Search 
and Rescue, both of which were on a fairly strong upward budgetary trajectory since 1996.
187  
On the other hand, as Figure 3 indicates, programs focused on security-related issues, such as 
Defense Readiness and Marine Safety and Security experienced a dramatic increase in the same 
period. 
 
                                                           
184 Figures drawn from the official budget authority figures of separate agencies, drawn either from their websites or 
from OMB.  Details on file with author. 
185  See M ICHAEL  E.  O’HANLON ET AL.,  PROTECTING THE AMERICAN  HOMELAND:  ONE  YEAR  ON xix (2
nd ed. 
2003)(noting that new Coast Guard funds “are doing little more than addressing previous shortfalls,” and amount to 
“hardly a change commensurate with the new responsibilities of this agency”). 
186 Kathleen Hunter, House Adopts Revision to Coast Guard Reauthorization, C.Q. TODAY, 
June 26, 2006.  
187 See Office of Management and Budget, Budget Authority File, 1976-2007, PUBLIC BUDGET DATABASE (2006), 
avail. at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/db.html. 67 
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  Similar budgetary developments affected the administrative functions of FEMA.   
FEMA’s budget has two distinct components: responding to specific disasters, such as Katrina; 
and (“base”) funding for FEMA’s administrative capacity, mitigation grants, and discretionary 
disaster relief programs.  The increase in FEMA’s budget shown in Table 5 reflects both the core 
program budget as well as special appropriations for specific disasters such as the September 11 
terrorist attacks that Congress and the President would find politically costly to ignore.  In 
contrast, FEMA’s ongoing administrative and discretionary functions, including activities such 
as oversight of disaster relief spending, flood insurance, and mitigation grants, may attract less 
public attention while inviting political controversy.  As Figure 4 indicates, if we focus on 
FEMA’s base budget, it becomes clear that FEMA’s funding has remained essentially flat (or 
slightly declined) since the creation of DHS.  By adding responsibilities and restricting FEMA’s 
core resources, budgetary developments since the merger further strained FEMA’s 






                                                           
188 See Democratic Staff, House Appropriations Committee, A Story of Neglect: A Review of FEMA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Staff Report (Sept. 8, 2005). 68 
 
Figure 4 
FEMA Base Funding Authorization (millions) 












E.  The Consequences of Reorganization 
  Our theoretical framework provides answers to the puzzles stated at the outset. Consider 
the first two puzzles:  Why is DHS so big, including so many agencies whose mission is 
tangentially related to homeland security? Part of the answer is that Bush sought to take the lead 
in providing homeland security. But he also used the DHS umbrella as a means for disguising a 
wide-ranging transformation of domestic policies. Forcing them under the homeland security 
umbrella had two separate, reinforcing effects. First, the reorganization forced agencies to 
transfer resources formerly devoted to their legacy mandates to homeland security concerns. 
Second, the new organizational control allowed the administration to downplay the portions of 
the organization that remained focused on the legacy mandates, further disrupting the agency’s 
ability to serve this mandate. Bush valued this transformation, not necessarily because this 
improved homeland security, but because this transforms a variety of domestic programs.  
Finally, consider the third puzzle: why did Bush insist that this policy be budget neutral despite 
the fact that he’s been so profligate in other areas? The answer is that budget neutrality is a 
central tool in forcing agencies to transform their operations so that they transfer resources out of 
their legacy mandates.  
Another way to understand the dynamic of domestic regulatory impacts associated with 
the creation of DHS is to contrast it with an alternative administrative approach. Suppose instead 69 
of creating a massive new department, Congress had mandated that agencies undertake a 
“Homeland Security Impact Statement” (HSIS) in parallel with the Environmental Impact 
Statements created in 1969. The HSIS would require agencies to study the impact of their 
proposed policies – and possibly also existing ones – on homeland security. As with EIS’s, 
HSIS’s are likely to have had mixed implications. To be done seriously, they would take 
considerable effort. And, as with EIS’s, the procedural nature of the exercise does not compel 
any policy changes. Moreover, this approach would not achieve Bush’s domestic policy goals of 
forcing agencies to substitute a considerable portion of resources and personal away from their 
legacy mandates. 
Ironically, shifting the focus away from legacy mandates does not necessarily enhance 
the effectiveness of security policies.  The distributive tendency has distorted DHS’s spending 
priorities away from high risk targets to areas of significantly lower priority.
189  The lack of 
reorganization of congressional oversight jurisdictions works to preserve the non-coordination 
status quo, directly hindering the goal of centralization and coordination. Partisan goals led to 
some extreme measures relatively independent of the goal of homeland security.   
Indeed, the disastrous performance of DHS and FEMA in the aftermath of the August 
2005 Hurricane Katrina is a natural consequence of a political process that played down 
transition costs and structural problems associated with the creation of DHS.  Recall that the 
DHS merger accelerated a process through which FEMA’s natural disaster and mitigation 
missions were eviscerated.
190  As the legacy missions were downgraded, many of experienced 
                                                           
189 Although DHS has taken some steps to preserve and expand the role of technical risk analysis in the allocation of 
homeland security-related grant funds, such efforts have played out against a backdrop of pressures forcing DHS to 
allocate funds in accordance with external political dynamics.  Two of the three major grant programs – the Law 
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program and the State Homeland Security Grant Program – have statutory 
baseline formulas that flatly require nearly half the money to be allocated equally on a state-by-state basis, with 
.75% of total funds going to each state and .25% of total funds allocated to a list of territories.  See Shawn Reese, 
Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS RL33583 22 (August 1, 2006).  In addition, the extent to which the Department has described recent 
changes as gradual moves to implement a more risk-based methodology suggest that the original allocation formulas 
more thoroughly reflected the influence of political pressures on DHS.  See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. and Scott Higham, 
Politics Cast Shadow on 9-11 Funds, CINCINNATI POST K1, Dec. 26, 2005, avail. at 2005 WLNR 22002388. 
190  See Ellison, supra note __.  See also Sruti Basavaraj, House Approves Funding for Natural Disaster 
Preparedness, NATION’S CITIES WKLY., July 7, 2003, avail. at 2003 WLNR 8843200 (“Since the consolidation of 
numerous federal agencies under the umbrella of DHS, many stakeholders have been concerned about the dilution of 
the FMEA missions of response, recovery and mitigation of all hazards – including natural disasters.”).  For a cogent 
argument explaining why it is problematic to assume that capacity to respond to natural disasters and to terrorist 
attacks are fungible, see Patrick S. Roberts, Reputation and Federal Emergency Preparedness Agencies, 1948-2003, 70 
workers left the agency.
191  Both a congressional committee and the White House issued reports 
detailing the mistakes made during the recovery efforts following the hurricane. The reports 
show how FEMA and DHS were unprepared for an emergency on the scale of Katrina.  Both 
DHS and FEMA were indicted for “lack[ing] adequate trained and experienced staff.”
192 The 
White House report suggests that certain disaster recovery responsibilities be transferred out of 
DHS, and considers the possibility of having DOJ oversee law enforcement and having HHS 
take over distributing aid to victims.
193 The congressional report goes beyond the conclusion that 
DHS and FEMA were unprepared.  Its analysis highlights the problems resulting from a structure 
where layers of organization separated the White House from the operational command and 
technical advice most directly associated with the disaster response.
194  The report concludes 
that, had the structure worked better, the response to Katrina would have commenced several 
days earlier than it did.
195  An internal DHS Inspector General also said as much.
196   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
PAPER PRESENTED AT THE 2004 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS’N MEETING 29 (Sept. 2, 2004)(on file with 
author): 
 
There are reasons to believe that terrorism is incompatible with the definition of all hazards that existed 
before September 11.  Terrorism lacks predictability and clear definitions: the enemy is elusive and it is 
unclear who or what should be involved in prevention and response.  Weapons could be biological, 
radiological, chemical, or traditional arms, and the medical and damage control elements of response 
overlap with law enforcement and investigative elements.  
191 See Bruce Alpert, Senators Get An Earful on FEMA, SBA: Horror Tales Feature Ineptitude, Delays, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 2, May 20, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 8696865 (“[C]onsistent turnover of personnel at 
FEMA forced them to start over multiple times in [citizens’] efforts for reimbursement or help”); Frank Davies, 
Doubts Persist About FEMA’s Ability to Respond, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER 42, May 7, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 
7937023 (“FEMA lost many top professionals in the past few years, and the turnover continued after Katrina.  In 
March [2006] a House committee reported that only 73% of FEMA staff positions were filled.”). 
192 Executive Summary of Findings, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and  
Response to Hurricane Katrina, http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm (Last accessed March 21, 2006).  
193 Amanda Ripley, Speed-Read: The White House Katrina Report, TIME (February 23, 2006) avail. at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1167076,00.html (last accessed March 21, 2006).  
194 See Failure of Initiative, supra note __, at 131.  The report notes that: 
 
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the development of the National Response 
Plan, an additional layer of management and response authority was placed between the President and 
FEMA, and additional response coordinating structures were established.  The Secretary of Homeland 
Security became the President’s principla disaster advisor… As part of these changes, critical response 
decisions were assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security [who] executed these responsibilities late, 
ineffectively, or not at all. 
195  See id. at 132: “[A]bsent a catastrophic disaster designation from [Homeland Security Secretary] Chertoff, 
federal response officials in the field eventually made the difficult decisions to bypass established procedures and 
provide assistance without waiting for… clear direction from Washington.”  Moreover, “the federal government 
stumble into a proactive response during the first several days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, as opposed to 
the Secretary making a clear and decisive choice to respond proactively…”  Id.  These events, according to the 
congressional report, did not merely reflect personal failures on the part of the Secretary, but were largely grounded 
in structural problems: “The White House Homeland Security Council, situated at the apex of the policy 71 
The storm and floods would have produced a crisis of major proportions under almost 
any circumstances.  But the available evidence suggests that the structural problems associated 
with DHS – particularly early in the cycle of its existence – made things worse.
197  Even if one 
makes unrealistic assumptions about the potential coordination payoffs over time, the 
shortcomings in FEMA’s and DHS’ response to Katrina are consistent with the existence of 
steep transition costs. 
Nor was FEMA the only bureau to suffer in the reorganization.  Problems also arose in 
other units, such as TSA.  The completion of its headquarters facility was delayed by the transfer 
to DHS.
198  Its internal structure was reorganized to remove federal air marshals from its 
jurisdiction.
199  Like FEMA and other bureaus, the TSA’s experience demonstrated how the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
coordination framework for DHS issues, itself failed to proactively de-conflict varying damage assessments.”  Id.  In 
the weeks immediately before Katrina arrived, Secretary Chertoff had already begun planning extensive efforts to 
redefine the relationship between the White House, the DHS secretariat, and FEMA.  These efforts also suggest the 
presence of pervasive structural problems in the flow of information, decisions, responses, and coordination efforts 
governing disaster response.  For a description of those efforts, see Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND  SECURITY (July 13, 2005), avail. at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0703.xml. 
196  See  Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster management 
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OIG-
06-32 23 (March 2006)(“FEMA and DHS were adjusting to the national response plan”).  The report emphasizes the 
transition costs associated with changes in the national response plan governing federal efforts after a disaster. For a 
discussion of how post-Katrina oversight of allegedly emergency expenditures at DHS continued to break down 
even after Katrina, see Mimi Hall, GAO: TV, iPods Part of Post-Katrina Waste, USA TODAY 3A, July 19, 2006, 
avail. at 2006 WLNR 12394508 (“Homeland Security Department employees, including Secret Service agents and 
FEMA workers, wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars on iPods, beer-making equipment, flat-screen TV, dog 
booties and clothing after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast last fall, according to government investigators”).  
The referenced GAO report suggests that the degree of inappropriate expenditures considerably exceeded what 
would have been ordinarily expected in the aftermath of a natural disaster. 
197 See Brinkley, supra note 10, at 268 (“In point of fact, the ultimate responsibility for the lackluster federal 
response to Katrina lay entirely with Chertoff, the secretary of Homeland Security.  Under rules instituted in January 
2005, Homeland Security was in charge of all major disasters, whether from international terrorism, Mother Nature, 
or infrastructure collapse.”). 
198 See Transportation Security Administration, MID-ATLANTIC CONSTRUCTION 37, Dec. 1, 2005, avail. at 2005 
WLNR 20192204 (“Complicating the short time frame and difficult logistics [associated with the preparation of 
TSA headquarters], the contractor also had to work with a newly formed government arm – TSA’s Homeland 
Security department.  Because the new department was still determining what its needs and requirements were, the 
construction team was constantly waiting for direction and reworking construction that had already been completed 
according to the original plan.”). 
199  See Eleanor Stables and Toni Johnson, CQ BillAnalysis: HR2360 – Fiscal 2006 Homeland Security 
Appropriations 3, April 3, 2006, avail. at 2006 WLNR 5945020 (“The Federal Air Marshals become part of TSA.  
Although part of TSA when the department was created, the marshals were switched to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement in November, 2003.  As part of the departmental reorganization, the administration proposed moving 
them back to TSA”).  This underscores the extent to which the Department secretariat’s authority to recommend and 
promote internal changes within its bureaus (some of which require congressional authorization) may impose 
transition costs on the operation of the bureaus.  72 
reorganization could trigger a variety of costs affecting the effective performance of legal 
mandates, including the need to adopt new technologies and internal bureaucratic procedures 
associated with a new department,
200 internal competition for control between bureau leaders and 
higher-level appointees,
201 the burdens of adjusting to new management arrangements altering 
the relationship between bureaus, other agencies, and the White House.
202  Even if one views 
these management problems as temporary transition costs, they raise the question of whether the 
potential efficiency from the creation of DHS made up for these costs.  We will return to this 




Though our primary focus has been on explaining the intricacies of DHS and its legal 
responsibilities, the following Part discusses two extensions of the argument.  First, we make 
some cautious observations relevant to the ongoing debates about judicial deference to agency 
legal interpretations.  Second, we describe how reorganizations appear to constitute an under-
appreciated technique through which executive authorities enhance control of bureaucratic 
functions 
A.  Structural Politics and Agency Legal Interpretations 
 The  familiar  Chevron doctrine holds that courts should defer to “reasonable” agency 
interpretations of law where a statute does not explicitly resolve the matter before a court.
203  A 
vast literature debates the merits of Chevron deference and its associated doctrines.
204  Though 
engaging that literature is not our primary concern, our analysis sheds light on certain facets of 
the debate.  In particular, our modest contribution to this ongoing debate further emphasizes the 
problems with making blanket assumptions about expertise or accountability, the two concepts 
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most frequently deployed to support judicial deference.  Given the political and bureaucratic 
problems that may pervade agencies, the case for deference is likely to be, at best, heavily 
context-dependent.   
The expertise justifications for deference antedate Chevron.
205  Our case study, rooted in 
a large literature on the political control of agencies, raises questions about that rationale by 
emphasizing the extent to which politics can be expected to interfere with efforts to build 
agencies possessed of subtle technical expertise.  In particular, large, umbrella organizations 
differ considerably from agencies with specific, narrow missions. When an agency is saddled 
with such a massive panoply of bureaucratic units and missions, the nature of its expertise 
becomes far less obvious.  At the very least, it seems that the case for deferring to expertise is 
stronger when the interpretation itself were coming from officials directly involved in 
policymaking (such as Coast Guard officials) rather than higher-level political appointees (such 
as the Secretary or General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security).  In contrast, at 
least one prominent scholarly account argues for the opposite approach – affording greater 
deference to agency interpretations originating with an agency head.
206   
Even leaving aside the question of the precise official whose interpretations merit 
deference, the shortcomings associated with DHS furnish reasons for skepticism about expertise 
justifications for deference.  Perhaps political or distributional considerations are just one aspect 
of the process driving the design of agencies.  By demonstrating how agencies may be poorly 
equipped to achieve their stated goals, however, our case study of DHS emphasizes the 
importance of qualifying any expertise argument by acknowledging (as a starting point) the 
extent to which agencies may be designed to serve political rather than principled purposes.   
Similar caveats apply to the accountability arguments for agency deference voiced by 
scholars and in court opinions.
207  Presumably, accountability justifications are grounded in the 
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idea that the elected branches are more responsive to public pressures than the judiciary.
208  
Ironically, the evidence suggests that the public supported the creation of DHS because it sought 
a more effective way of organizing the bureaucratic units with security-related functions.  Our 
analysis questions whether such gains were realized in practice. It also shows that this rationale 
alone fails to explain not only the size and scope of DHS, but the underlying decision to create it.  
Moreover, the logic of any plausible version of the accountability argument seems to depend on 
a political dynamic where the Administration receives deference in interpreting the law because 
it is taking responsibility for regulatory policy choices.
209  The opposite seems to have occurred 
in the case of DHS – impacts on regulatory policy, ranging from environmental enforcement to 
trade-policy occurred without the President or his Administration taking explicit responsibility 
for them.   
In short, accountability arguments for deference appear strained in light of how 
presidents can use the politics of structure to make regulatory choices more opaque to voters who 
are presumed (in most such arguments) to make decisions at least partly on the basis of 
regulatory policy.  Indeed, even defining accountability in a non-tautological fashion becomes 
exceedingly difficult in a world where multiple branches of government with conflicting agendas 
are responsive to the political process and crises can increase public demands for structural 
changes that are prescriptively troubling. 
Our claim here is a limited one.  Our criticisms are not of deference, but of the most 
commonly-asserted arguments in favor of deference.  Although prescriptive questions about the 
degree of deference are complex,
210 our analysis suggests that across-the-board approaches to 
deference are likely to be difficult to defend.
211  If agencies forged in crisis can be poorly 
equipped for success and have complicated indirect impacts on regulatory activity beyond their 
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primary areas of focus, then it is not obvious that courts are naturally worse interpreters (in terms 
of some defensible consequentialist metric) across the board.  Evaluating relative merits of courts 
and agencies as interpreters in such a world depends on defining concepts such as 
“accountability” in a non-circular manner and on empirical guesses about how courts interpret 
the law compared to agencies, the potential legislative responses to different regimes.  Given the 
highly abstract nature of many discussions regarding the merits of judicial deference to agency 
legal interpretations,
212 we suspect that it will be fruitful to refocus such discussion on the 
context-specific political realities that determine how agencies are actually designed, and how 
they are likely to function in the real world.
 213    
B.  Structural Politics and Presidential Control in Other Contexts 
  Our theory explains how government reorganizations well beyond the context of DHS 
can serve as tools for politicians, particularly presidents, to enhance their political control of the 
bureaucracy and to reshape how the public views bureaus’ core missions.  Similar dynamics 
appear to have shaped the stories of two previous, and significant, reorganizations – the creation 
of the Federal Security Agency in the late 1930s (which eventually spawned today’s 
Departments of Health and Human Services and Education), and the creation of the Department 
of Energy under Carter. 
In 1939, President Roosevelt finally secured from Congress the reorganization authority 
he so aggressively sought.  Almost immediately, he merged the functions of more than a half-
dozen independent or subordinate social welfare and regulatory agencies closely associated with 
his Administration’s policy priorities to create the Federal Security Agency (FSA) in 1939.  The 
forerunner of the sprawling Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now two separate 
cabinet agencies), the reorganization that created the FSA appears to have served multiple 
functions.  First, it gave some of the Administration’s most prized social welfare and regulatory 
agencies a politically-useful association with the concept of national security at a time when 
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opposition to Roosevelt was growing in Congress.
214  In effect, the agency served to market 
(with Roosevelt’s help) its programs as critical elements of a national security strategy that 
included domestic civil defense; programs to promote the economic health and well-being of 
Americans who could be called upon to participate directly or indirectly in a war-related effort; 
federal involvement in education policy to promote the dissemination of skills allegedly useful to 
national defense; and public health efforts designed to limit the extent to which disease affected 
national capacity.
215  Second, the creation of the FSA allowed the new, centralized supervisory 
staff to function as an additional layer of political appointees supplementing the meager White 
House staff.
216  Third, the new agency gave the White House a vehicle that could be used to 
provide political cover for particularly sensitive national security projects, such as defensive and 
offensive biological weapons research.
217  
The FSA’s fate suggests that presidential control sought through agency reorganization to 
shape public perceptions of the core goals of the affected agencies. Distinguishing FSA from the 
current example, Roosevelt appeared to believe that the benefits in terms of repackaging the 
agencies outweighed any danger that their flexibility would actually be diluted because of the 
new national security mission. 
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Several decades later, President Carter confronted a deepening energy crisis and sought 
to create a new cabinet-level Department of Energy.  Although his decision to seek the creation 
of the Energy Department was fueled in part by a desire to impress the mass public with his 
leadership in a salient issue area, this rationale does not fully the scope of the Department, or the 
legal powers the Administration sought to confer on it.  In fact, the Carter Administration sought 
to enhance presidential power through the creation of the new department in two ways.  First, he 
sought to give the Secretary – a political appointee – power to regulate energy prices which had 
previously been vested in independent agencies.
218  This provoked opposition in Congress, 
resulting in a compromise that denied the President some of what he sought but nonetheless 
enhanced his legal control over energy policy.
219  Second, Carter incorporated a broad range of 
agencies with national security responsibilities – most notably the National Laboratories 
involved in nuclear weapons design and production then housed in the Energy Research and 
Development Administration – in addition to agencies focused on the matters more directly 
associated with domestic energy concerns.
220  By moving the National Laboratories and strategic 
petroleum reserves into an executive department with a new mission and a layer of political 
appointees, the President gained influence over these functions and over how the public 
understood their purpose.
221
These two additional illustrations show that executive efforts to insist on “presidential 
administration” of public bureaucracies long predate recent Administrations, as do legislative 
efforts to rein in such moves. And in accordance our study of the DHS, these two cases also 
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This article used the evolution of homeland security policy after September 11 as a case 
study to analyze the allocation of legal authority within the bureaucracy, and the impact of 
bureaucratic structure on the implementation of legal mandates.  Despite a large body of 
previous scholarship on bureaucracy and the implementation of legal mandates, such work has 
not yielded comprehensive theories linking the politics of bureaucratic structure to the behavior 
of the mass public in a crisis, inter- and intra-branch bargaining involving the legislature, and 
specific legal interpretations and policy outcomes straddling national security and more 
conventional domestic policy issues.  In part because of these gaps, existing explanations for the 
creation of the new Department of Homeland Security have failed to provide adequate answers 
to crucial questions, such as why the president switched from opposition to support of the 
bureaucratic reorganization and why, after that initial resistance, the scope of his proposal was 
greater than that of past and existing proposals. 
To address these questions, we began by updating existing theories of the legislative 
process to encompass the following four premises:  (1) Other things being equal, politicians seek 
opportunities to control bureaucratic resources along with opportunities to signal positions that 
are appealing to the public, and parties differ in their substantive policy agendas.  (2) The long-
term marginal impact of a particular type of bureaucratic reorganization on the performance of 
complex legal mandates, such as promoting homeland security, is far more uncertain than 
politicians tend to acknowledge.  Nonetheless, changes in bureaucratic structure can have 
predictable statutory, organizational, and budgetary consequences by forcing bureaucracies to cut 
back on the performance of particular missions. (3) As the responses to drug scares, energy 
shortages, and the September 11 attacks demonstrate, a newly attentive public may favor 
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structural changes even while they remain ignorant about the details.  (4) Even within parties, 
legislators have divergent interests depending on their committee assignments and seniority.  
None of these presumptions should be controversial.  But taken together, they hold 
underappreciated implications for our understanding of the design and implementation of legal 
mandates.  As individual legislators, the President, and political parties jockey for advantage, the 
political game tends to suppress important prescriptive concerns about the costs and benefits of 
centralization, the transition costs associated with reorganizations, and the fit between 
congressional and executive branch organization.  Moreover, the combined effect of crises and 
public uncertainty about the impact of reorganization allow presidents to reshape administrative 
and regulatory policy and assert greater control over bureaucratic discretion.   
Our evidence suggests the Administration exploited its legislative opening to enhance 
presidential control and reshape agencies’ administrative discretion.  It chose that course despite 
the risks – identified by the White House’s own advisers – that doing so would adversely affect 
the performance of the security functions that justified the merger in the first place.
223  The 
President dismissed early consolidation efforts that seemed “kind of small to me,” and directed 
his staff to “think big” as they forged a plan for the department.
224  In response, the secret group 
that made decisions about what to include in the President's proposal not only crafted a 
consolidation plan larger than anything legislators had, but seriously considered adding three 
more major regulatory agencies to DHS – the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATF, and the 
FAA.  Despite the fact that many legislators anticipated reorganization’s adverse effect on legacy 
mandates, the HSA made statutory and organizational changes allowing legacy regulatory and 
administrative functions to be compromised.
225  Republicans had a long record of wanting to 
control and limit the administrative activities of agencies such as FEMA and the Coast Guard, a 
goal that was likely to be accomplished if the statutory and organizational changes made by the 
HSA were implemented in a revenue-constrained environment, which is what the President 
promised.   And excluding supplemental appropriations, the Administration proved surprisingly 
adept at keeping revenues flat for some core functions while shifting resources away from legacy 
mandates. 
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The aftershocks from the Administration’s decision to pursue reorganization have 
exacted a price, and plainly demonstrate the importance of these dynamics.  Key advisors within 
the Bush Administration learned early on that creating the Department risked making the 
problem of coordinating security worse.  The concerns were not unfounded.  Although our paper 
is not primarily a normative assessment, we can now revisit – in light of our analysis – the 
question of whether the creation of DHS enhanced homeland security.  Attributing marginal 
security-related effects to changes in organizational structure is difficult, and indeed, the 
existence of uncertainty about this plays a role in our account.  Might the uncertainty conceal a 
positive probability that the statutory choices made in creating the Department could enhance the 
security of Americans at a time when many might be willing to trade off other government 
services in exchange for such improvements?  We believe the answer is negative.  The 
department's creation is almost certainly related to a net loss in the efficiencies associated with 
homeland security. 
To see why, recall that virtually no serious observer questioned that the transition costs of 
creating the department would be pronounced.
226   The case for transition costs (defined as 
obstacles diminishing the department’s efficient output of security-related services for some 
discrete length of time) is fairly straightforward.  Problems included the introduction of 
uncertainty regarding internal lines of authority, disruptions in established links between 
bureaucratic sub-units with one another and with the White House, a focus on setting up internal 
control structures rather than on performing the agency's substantive mission, transfer of 
authority to a department that initially was almost entirely devoid of resources to monitor all the 
security-related functions of its new bureaus, a continuing fragmentation of legislative oversight 
authority, and a depletion of key staff so that they could serve on detail in the central 
department.
227  From a circumstantial perspective, the performance of the TSA during its time at 
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DHS and of FEMA with Katrina is entirely consistent with the presence of long-term transition 
costs.
228  The President's tremendous reluctance to create the Department at first in part reflected 
these costs.
229
The question is then whether the potential security benefits are high enough to offset the 
transition costs.  And these benefits could presumably come from two sources: (a) efficiency 
gains from coordination and centralization, or (b) shifts in resources away from legacy mandates 
toward presumably more pressing security-related missions.
230  With respect to efficiency gains 
from coordination and centralization, we found the Administration's theoretical case 
unconvincing.
231   It provided no reasonable explanation for why a single cabinet agency 
represented an improvement over the Homeland Security Council structure.  No consideration is 
given in its public communications to the offsetting advantages of decentralization, which have 
been central to spurring aggressive anti-drug enforcement, and may play an important role in 
intelligence and policy innovation.
232  No discussion exists of the extent to which some agencies 
across cabinet departments have better coordination (such as ATF and FBI across Treasury and 
the Justice Department) than other agencies within departments such as the Navy and Army 
within Defense,
233 or DEA and FBI within Justice.
234  And no attention is given to the reality that 
fragmentation actually persists (even assuming it were helpful) because of the relative 
decentralization of congressional control.
235   
Moreover, a theoretically coherent prescriptive case for the Department’s creation would 
have been difficult for Congress to accept.  If one examines the theoretical literature on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their eyes on the main ball – which is not to organize for homeland security but to prevent, protect, and respond to a 
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organizations and bureaucracy,
236 the best case we could envision out for the value of 
centralization is one that involves either the value of distinctive expertise at the top of the agency 
or of concentrating accountability in one official to permit trade-offs across (rather than within) 
bureaus.  But neither of these fit with the Department’s reality.  It is difficult to accept that Ridge 
or Chertoff were simultaneously experts in customs interdiction, disaster response, and technical 
cyber-security; the resource-transfer goals could have been accomplished with congressional and 
presidential support of a White House-based Office of Homeland Security entailing fewer 
transition costs (which is, not coincidentally, what the President first chose to support). 
Which brings us to the difficult question of whether the security-related gains from the 
transfer of resources is enough to offset the transition costs.  Such a prospect is unlikely.  For 
one, homeland security threats may be plausibly viewed as the encompassing natural disaster 
response functions, a position that the leadership of DHS has belatedly taken after Katrina and 
accords with President William McKinley’s 19
th observation that “I am more afraid of the West 
Indian Hurricane than I am of the entire Spanish Navy.”
237 Yet natural disaster response appears 
to have suffered not only from the transition costs associated with the merger but from the 
Administration’s focus on statutory and administrative changes redirecting attention towards 
terrorism-related homeland security threats.
238  For another, it does not appear that the most 
security problems experts often cite as most pressing – involving efforts to secure weapons of 
mass destruction, strengthening public health and critical infrastructure, and enhancing response 
and recovery – have been meaningfully addressed by shifting resources within bureaus.
239  
Finally, even if internal shifts in bureau resources (as opposed to additional resources) were 
essential to addressing the preceding problems, those benefits could have been partially or almost 
entirely captured without the creation of the DHS.
240 Without the creation of DHS and its 
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administrative oversight apparatus, however, the President would have been forced to be much 
more explicit about the bureau-level changes wrought by the HSA legislation. 
To explain these developments, our account shows how three crucial variables affecting 
homeland security policy – whether to create a new department at all, its overall size and scope, 
and its congressional oversight structure – have been driven in specific directions by political 
rather than prescriptive considerations.  Rare circumstances may help bring about occasional 
exceptions.  In some policy domains, such those involving benefit payments to retirees, results 
may be so easy to observe that electoral constraints may force politicians to care about whether 
an agency is well-organized to meet its stated goals.  In others, an agency may find itself with a 
unique degree of autonomy – allowing it to leverage the mass public’s reactions during a crisis – 
and there may happen to be some alignment between the agenda of the agency’s leaders and 
what’s prescriptively attractive.  They also raise some questions about some of the canonical 
justifications – grounded in expertise and accountability through presidential control – for 
judicial deference to agency legal interpretations.  Although these questions do not augur for 
rejection of those justifications altogether, they ought to prompt scholars and policymakers to 
reexamine the prescriptive merits of vesting discretion in agencies that are not effectively 
designed to carry out their alleged functions. 
The incapacity of federal officials to effectively address broadly-held concerns about 
security in the midst of a crisis is ironic.  Principle and intuition suggest that prescriptive 
concerns should be strongest in the midst of a crisis.  Our analysis shows that it is otherwise in 
practice.  In order for prescriptive concerns to prove significant, politicians must encounter 
precisely the sort of counterweight that so rarely emerges in the political game over bureaucratic 
structure:  bureaucratic actors that have forged a rare degree of autonomy and seek to use it in 
prescriptively-attractive ways, or an electorate displaying an uncommon degree of sophistication 
leading it to resist naïve arguments about the benefits of reorganization.  Such circumstances are, 
at best, strikingly unusual.  They are even less common in the midst of a crisis.  But without 
them, a crisis bureaucracy is bound to be a bureaucracy in crisis.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
exceed the transition costs.  And if that burden can be carried, then the weak rationales the White House advanced 
are especially puzzling.  We can think of no political reason why the White House would not want to offer its best 
rationales for the security benefits at the time when its strategy had shifted to trying to sell the Department and 
taking credit for its creation.  See supra Part I. 